Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act by Oliphant, Robert E.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 4 Article 1
1996
Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
Robert E. Oliphant
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Oliphant, Robert E. (1996) "Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act," William
Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 21: Iss. 4, Article 1.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/1
IS SWEEPING CHANGE POSSIBLE?
MINNESOTA ADOPTS THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE
FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
Robert E. Oliphantt
I. INTRODUCTION ........................... 991
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY .................... 994
A. Historical Development of UJFSA ............... 995
B. The Federal Government Moves Aggressively into the
Support Arena ............................ 999
C. The U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support . 1001
D. Minnesota's Legislature Acts to Adopt and Implement
U!FSA ................................ 1005
III. SUMMARIZING UIFSA's MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES 1009
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SuP-
PORT ACT .............................. 1015
A. General Provisions ....................... 1015
1. Section 518C.101: Definitions ............. 1015
2. Section 518C.102: Tribunal of This State .... 1020
3. Section 518C. 103: Remedies Cumulative ..... 1020
B. Jurisdiction ............................ 1020
1. Section 518C.201: Bases for Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident .......................... 1020
2. Section 518C.202: Procedure When Exercising
Jurisdiction over Nonresident .............. 1028
3. Section 518C.203: Initiating and Responding
Tribunal of This State .................. 1029
4. Section 518C.204: Simultaneous Proceedings in
Another State ........................ 1030
5. Section 518C.205: Continuing, Exclusive Juris-
diction ............................ 1030
6. Section 518C.206: Enforcement and Modification
of Support Order by Tribunal Having Continuing
Jurisdiction .........................
t Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota. The research
on the UIFSA committee hearings was done by Associate Editor Colleen Hoey.
1
Oliphant: Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interst
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REWEW
1032
7. Section 518C.207: Recognition of Child Support
Orders ............................. 1033
8. Section 518C.208: Multiple Child Support Orders
for Two or More Obligees ................. 1035
9. Section 518C.209: Credit for Payments ...... 1035
C. Civil Provisions of General Application ........ 1036
1. Section 518C.301: Proceedings Under This Chap-
ter ............................... 1036
2. Section 518C.302: Action by Minor Parent .... 1037
3. Section 518C.303: Application of Law of This
State ............................... 1037
4. Section 518C.304: Duties of Initiating Tribunal 1038
5. Section 518C.305: Duties and Powers of Respond-
ing Tribunal ......................... 1038
6. Section 518C.306: Inappropriate Tribunal .... 1041
7. Section 518C.307: Duties of Support Enforcement
Agency ............................ 1042
8. Section 518C.308: Duty of Attorney General ... 1043
9. Section 518C.309: Private Counsel ......... 1044
10.Section 518C.310: Duties of State Information
Agency ............................ 1044
11.Section 518C.311: Pleadings and Accompanying
Documents .......................... 1045
12.Section 518C.312: Nondisclosure of Information
in Exceptional Circumstance ............. 1046
13.Section 518C.313: Costs and Fees .......... 1046
14.Section 518C.314: Limited Immunity of Petitioner 1047
15.Section 518C.315: Nonparentage as Defense ... 1048
16Section 518C.316: Special Rules of Evidence and
Procedure ........................... 1048
17.Section 518C.317: Communications Between
Tribunals ............................ 1052
18.Section 518C.318: Assistance with Discovery ... 1052
19.Section 518C.319: Receipt and Disbursement of
Payments ........................... 1052
D. Section 518C.401: Petition to Establish Support
Order ............................... 1053
E. Direct Enforcement of Order of Another State Without
Registration ............................. 1054
1. Section 518C.501: Recognition of Income-With-
[Vol. 21
2
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/1
MINNESOTA ADOPTS UIFSA
holding Order of Another State ............. 1054
2. Section 518C.502: Administrative Enforcement of
Orders ............................. 1055
F Enforcement and Modification of Support Order After
Registration ............................. 1056
1. Section 518C.601: Registration of Order for En-
forcement ........................... 1056
2. Section 518C.602: Procedure to Register Order for
Enforcement ......................... 1057
3. Section 518C. 603: Effect of Registration for En-
forcement ........................... 1058
4. Section 518C.604: Choice of Law .......... 1059
5. Section 518C.605: Notice of Registration of Order 1060
6. Section 518C.606: Procedure to Contest Validity
or Enforcement of Registered Order ......... 1061
7. Section 518C.607: Contest of Registration or
Enforcement ......................... 1062
8. Section 518C.608: Confirmed Order ........ 1063
9. Section 518C.609: Procedure to Register Child
Support Order of Another State for Modification 1063
10. Section 518C. 610: Effect of Registration for Modi-
fication ............................. 1064
11. Section 518C. 611: Modification of Child Support
Order of Another State .................. 1065
12.Section 518C.612: Recognition of Order Modified
in Another State ...................... 1069
G. Section 518C. 701: Proceeding to Determine Parentage 1070
H. Interstate Rendition ...................... 1072
1. Section 518C.801: Grounds for Rendition .... 1072
2. Section 518C.802: Conditions of Rendition ... 1073
I. Section 518C. 901: Uniformity of Application and
Construction ........................... 1074
V. FEDERAL INTERVENTION .................... 1074
VI. CONCLUSION ............................ 1078
I. INTRODUCTION
During its 1994 session, the Minnesota Legislature enacted
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA),' a sweeping
1. Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, ch. 630, 1994 Minn. Laws 1815
(codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 518C (1994)).
1996]
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piece of legislation intended to remedy the tragic situation of the
more than 200,000 Minnesota children caught up in a feeble,
inept child support collection system. 2 The Act recognizes the
need to assist the rapidly escalating number of female-headed
families who, because of little or no financial support, are
moving into poverty.'
The Act limits its application to problems associated with
establishing, enforcing, and modifying child support in the
interstate context.4 In some areas, the Act goes much further
than its predecessor, the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforce-
ment of Support Act (RURESA).
In its model form, UIFSA was endorsed by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,6 the
2. According to the Minnesota Attorney General, 57% of Minnesota's noncustodi-
al parents are behind in their child support payments, owing $551 million in back child
support. Patricia L. Baden, Statewide Ads Aim to Change Attitudes About Child Support,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 7, 1995, at B1.
Estimates of Minnesota children who received support in the interstate context
could not be located by the author. Nationally, however, about three in 10 child
support cases are interstate. U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORT
OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM at xii (1992) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM].
3. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that if a child is living with just one parent,
and that parent is the mother, there is virtually a one-in-three chance that the child and
mother will be poor. GORDON H. LESTER, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, CONSUMER INCOME, SERIES P-60, NO. 173, CHILD SUPPORT AND
ALIMONY: 1989 at 1-2 (1991). If the child's mother was never married, the likelihood
that the child and mother will be poor is one-in-two. Id.
For the year endingJune 1990, over 1,088,000 births, about one fourth of all births
(4,179,000), were to unmarried women. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 120.
In contrast, thirty years ago it was estimated that one child in 10 was born to an
unmarried mother. Id. In 1991, estimates are that 56% of black children, 23.2% of
Hispanic children, and 17.2% of white children were born to unmarried women. Id.
In 1991, 67.8% of all births to women ages 15-19 were to unmarried women. Id.
4. MINN. STAT. § 518C.901 (1994) (providing that the Act is to be construed to
"effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to 'the subject of
this chapter among states enacting it."). The states that have adopted the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518C (West 1995).
5. For example, UIFSA provides for an interstate action to determine parentage
and establish appropriate support in the interstate context. See infra part IIA for a
discussion of the UIFSA predecessors.
6. UIFSA was endorsed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws at its annual conference held in San Francisco, California, July 30 to August
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American Bar Association,7 and the United States Commission
on Interstate Child Support.8
Given these powerful endorsements, it is little wonder that
the Minnesota Legislature neither seriously debated nor long
considered the provisions of the Act during its spring 1994
session.9 It also explains the absence in the legislative record of
discussion about existing Minnesota law, individual liberty, and
privacy that are implicated in the Act.' °
Close inspection of the Act, however, leads one to ask
whether this well-meaning piece of legislation has gone too far.
Is its draconian means justified by its collection ends? In the
macro sense, is the Act a by-product of the perceptible drift of
a society willing to sacrifice fundamental legal principles and
processes that protect individuals from arbitrary decision making
for the chance to curb a major societal predicament?
The Act was not passed in isolation; the child support
problem has triggered other related measures. For example, the
use of administrative judges in child support litigation, viewed as
cheaper and more efficient than the traditional articled judicial
model, has been increased during every legislative session over
the past several years.' Also, nonlawyers now may prosecute
7. UIFSA was endorsed at an American Bar Association meeting on February 9,
1993. Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 485, 490 (1994).
8. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 232. The U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support was established by Congress in 1988 to address the problem
of interstate child support. Id. at 3. When the Commission issued its 1992 comprehen-
sive report on the child support fiasco, it incorporated and endorsed virtually all of the
earlier recommendations made by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Id. at 231-32, 236.
9. See Hearings on Minn. S.F. 1662 Before the Senate Comm. on Family Services, Before
the Subcomm. on Family Law of the Senate Judiciay Comm., Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.;
and Hearings on Minn. H.F. 1792 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 78th Legislative Sess.
(1994) [hereinafter Hearings] (audio tape).
10. See id.
11. In 1985, the federal government passed legislation requiring that states
establish an expedited procedure to hear and decide child support matters. ROBERT
E. OLIPHANT, MINNESOTA FAMILY LAW PRIMER § 21.1 (4th ed. 1992). See 45 C.F.R.
§ 303.101 (1993). If state judicial machinery was meeting support requirements, how-
ever, a state could request exemption from the expedited processes. OLIPHANT, supra,
§ 21.1. "Minnesota received a three-year exemption from the expedited process because
a Minnesota Department of Human Services 1985 survey showed all counties were in
compliance with the requirements." Id. A survey conducted in 1988, however, found
17 counties were not in compliance. Id.
In 1987, the Minnesota Legislature initiated a child support pilot project in Dakota
County that used administrative law judges rather than district court judges to hear
1996]
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child support cases in administrative courts. 12 Other legislative
efforts have appeared; however, in some instances, they are
without direction or clarity.i
This article provides an analysis of the new Act along with
a discussion of the implications that certain provisions may have
on individual liberty. Examples are provided that might prove
helpful, especially where the Act makes major changes in
existing law. An effort has been made to point out the major
differences between the new Act and RURESA.
Part II reviews the background and history of the Act. Part
III summarizes UIFSA's most important features. Part IV
provides a comprehensive analysis of each section of the statute,
and Part V takes a look at the future of UIFSA.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
Minnesota's version of UIFSA is based on the model act
promulgated in 1992 by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws. 4 UIFSA replaces Minnesota's
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA). 1s
UIFSA's purpose is to make the collection of child support
child and medical support matters. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 518.551, subd. 10 (Supp.
1987). The purpose of the project was to evaluate the efficiency of the administrative
process. OLIPHANT, supra, § 21.1. The project was limited to disputes in which Dakota
County was a party and was to end June 30, 1989. Id. At the end of the two-year test
period, the results from Dakota County were deemed so successful that the 1989
legislature provided authority to the Commissioner of Human Services to designate
other counties for participation in the project. Id. See MINN. STAT. § 518.551, subd. 10
(Supp. 1989). The project was then expanded to 17 counties. OLIPHANT, supra, § 21.1.
Counties designated by the Commissioner of Human Services were Becker, Beltrami,
Carver, Cass, Clay, Dakota, Lac Qui Parle, Lincoln, Mille Lacs, Mower, Nicollet,
Pipestone, Polk, Rock, Scott, Steams, and Winona. Id. § 21.2 n.3. In 1993, it was
estimated that about 40 counties were designated. Id. § 21.2.
12. See MINN. STAT. § 518.5511, subd. 5 (1994).
13. For example, Minnesota Statutes Section 518.11 has added confusion to the
question of personal service because it is unclear why the new section was added or
what was intended. The statute is subject to a variety of interpretations. See infra note
130 and accompanying text.
14. UIFSA was drafted, approved, and recommended for enactment in all the states
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. UNIF.
INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT, Historical Notes, 9 U.LA 121 (Supp. 1994).
15. See Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, ch. 436, 1982
Minn. Laws 391 [hereinafter RURESA], repealed by Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act, ch. 630, art. 9, § 4, 1994 Minn. Laws 1815, 1837.
[Vol. 21
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faster and more efficient in the interstate context. 16 In attempt-
ing to achieve this objective, the Act does a number of things.
In conjunction with Minnesota Statutes Section 518.5511,17 the
Act broadly defines who may enforce or modify support orders
and who may determine parentage. 18  It also contains a
long-arm statute for use in interstate support and parentage
actions.' 9 Proponents of the long-arm provisions contend that
such provisions make the initiation of a child support case easier;
provide greater access to information about the status of the case
to those people most affected; and establish, at any given time,
a single state that can obtain continuing and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the child support award.20
The Act also contains special evidentiary provisions,2'
22discovery sections, and a provision that imposes a penalty on
an obligor who asserts a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination
defense during a UIFSA hearing.23
Some believe that the Act will lead to the eventual demise
of Kulko v. Superior Court.24 Others believe that it is the corner-
stone of the foundation for an eventual federal takeover of all
child support enforcement.
2 5
A. Historical Development of UIFSA
When Congress passed the 1935 Social Security Act, it
included a provision for furnishing funds to destitute mothers to
help with the care of their dependent children.26 The Act also
16. John J. Sampson & Paul M. Kurtz, UliSA: An Interstate Support Act for the 21st
Century, 27 FAM. L.Q. 85, 87 (1993).
17. MINN. STAT. § 518.5511 (1994) (providing rules on maintenance and support
payments in all proceedings involving a child support award).
18. See id. §§ 518C.101(w), .102. Note that the legislature uses the word "tribunal"
throughout the Act, defining it to include courts, administrative agencies, or
quasi-judicial entities authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to
determine parentage.
19. See id. § 518C.201.
20. See, e.g., Margaret C. Haynes, Supporting Our Children: A Blueprint for Reform, 27
FAM. L.Q. 7, 23 (1993).
21. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.316 (1994).
22. See id. §§ 518C.316, .318.
23. See id. § 518C.316(g).
24. See Haynes, supra note 20, at 23-24.
25. Id. at 22.
26. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988). This form of assistance is referred to as Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Social Security Amendments of 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 240(b), 81 Stat. 821, 911 (1967).
19961
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required a parent who was absent from the family home to pay
child support." It did not contain, however, an effective
mechanism to ensure that an absent-from-the-home, financially
sound parent would provide that support. Divorces in the 1930s
were, of course, few, and the problems created by large numbers
of children being born to out-of-wedlock mothers were almost
nonexistent.
28
Following World War II, and for the next quarter century,
the states and the federal government seemed baffled at their
inability to effectively combat the nonsupport problem. By the
1980s the nonsupport problem had reached epidemic propor-
tions; yet this should not have been a surprise. As early as 1950,
it was clear that a major reason for nonsupport was parental
absence-mostly on the part of fathers. Figures from 1950, for
example, indicate that forty-nine percent of children receiving
AFDC were eligible for such assistance because of parental
absence from the home.29
In 1950, in response to the growing need for assistance,
Congress amended the Social Security Act to require that state
welfare agencies notify appropriate law enforcement officials if
a child receiving support under the AFDC program was aban-
doned or deserted by a parent.' Also in 1950, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Bar Association approved the model Uniform Recipro-
cal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) i  Several states
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 652(a)(1) (1988).
28. In the United States, the number of divorces substantially increased from
385,000 in 1950 and 393,000 in 1960 to 708,000 in 1970 and 1,181,000 in 1979.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1982-83 at 82 (103d ed. 1982). "In 1963, 66.31% of all terminated
marriages ended by death and 33.69% by divorce. By 1979 only 42.77% terminated by
death, while 57.23% ended by dissolution." UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT, Prefatory Note,
9A U.LA. 19 (1987). In 1981 there were 2,438,000 marriages and 1,219,000 divorces.
Id. This "two to one ratio contrasts with 1930, when there were six marriages to every
dissolution." Id.
29. OLIPHANT, supra note 11, § 29.1. Forty-nine percent of children receiving
AFDC equaled 818,000 children. Id.
30. Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent Children: The
Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 457, 510
(1987-88).
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subsequently adopted some version of URESA.3" URESA was
the first serious effort to bring uniformity and encourage
cooperation among the various states in the child support
area.
33
URESA provided a mechanism for establishing child support
obligations and enforcing them across state lines without the
necessity of a custodial parent traveling to a distant forum.34
Either the custodial parent or the state, on behalf of the child
and custodial parent, filed a support petition in the initiating
state, usually the state where the custodian and child lived. 5
The petition was then forwarded to the responding state,
ordinarily the state where the noncustodial parent resided or
owned property.36 A county attorney in the responding state
appeared on behalf of the custodial parent at a hearing on the
petition. 7 The obligor also was present.38 If, after the hear-
ing, the responding tribunal found a support duty under its laws
and determined that the obligor had the ability to pay, a support
order was entered.39 Payments made by the obligor pursuant
to the order were forwarded to the initiating state for distribu-
32. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 304-80 to -98 (1989); ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.25.010-.270
(1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46b-180 to -211 (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 601-640 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-301 to -326 (1981 & Supp.
1994); GUAM Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1500-1531 (1970); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-2-1-1 to -39
(West 1979 & Supp. 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 10-301 to -340 (1991 & Supp.
1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273A, §§ 1-17 (West 1990 & Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 93-11-1 to -73 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 454.010-.360 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1995); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 30-43 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1994); P.R. LAWS ANN.
tiL 32, §§ 3311-3313v (1968 & Supp. 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-5-201 to -229 (1991
& Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-31-1 to -39 (1990 & Supp. 1994); V.I. CODE
ANN., tit. 16, §§ 391-429 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.21.010-.910 (West 1986
& Supp. 1995).
33. In 1909 and 1910, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed and
adopted the Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act (UDNA). UNIF. RECIPROCAL
ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B U.L.A. 556 (1987). UDNA made
it a crime "for a husband to desert or willfully neglect or refuse to provide for the sup-
port and maintenance of his wife in destitute or necessitous circumstances or for a
parent to fail in the same duty to his child under sixteen years of age." Id. UDNA
applied only to males. Id. The drawback to UDNA was its lack of civil remedies and
its inability to address interstate cases. Id.
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tion to the custodial parent.'
Despite the advent of URESA, the problem of no or
inadequate child support continued to rage like an out-of-control
forest fire, and Congress continued to address the problem.
Legislation was passed allowing a state or local welfare agency to
obtain the address and place of employment of an absent parent
who owed child support under an existing court order from the
files of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.41
Another provision gave states access to Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) records so that addresses of absent parents owing support
could be located.42
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved a new version of URESA.43
Because the new version contained so many changes, it was
labeled the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (RURESA)." 4 Despite these efforts, the nonsupport prob-
lem continued.
Adding to the conflagration was the advent of no-fault
divorce in the early 1970s, which triggered a huge unanticipated
leap in the number of divorces between couples with children.4'
By 1974, the number of children receiving AFDC because of an
absent parent made up 78% of the total AFDC paid out by the
federal government.' Of those receiving AFDC, only 26.4%
were covered by court orders or voluntary legal agreements for
child support.4 7 Of those with child support orders, only 21%
received the judicially mandated amount.' In other words, the
obligors, mostly fathers, were not paying their fair share of
support. Moreover, the state child support enforcement system
40. Id.
41. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 340, 79 Stat. 286,
411 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988)).
42. See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 211(b), 81 Stat.
821, 897 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 610 (1988)).
43. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 228.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 28.
46. OLIPHANT, supra note 11, § 29.1. The number 6,062,000 represents the total
number of children receiving AFDC. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citing Child Support and the Work Bonus: Hearings on S. Res. 1842, 2081 Before
the Senate Finance Comm., 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); Mary F. Bernet, The Child Support
Provisions: Comments on the New Federal Laws, in THE YOUNGEST MINORITY I 491 (Sanford
N. Katz ed., 1977)).
[Vol. 21
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was failing in its role of identifying the fathers and in ordering
and enforcing support obligations.
Despite the dismal record of support enforcement compiled
by the states, most states adopted some form of RURESA or its
equivalent.49 RURESA, like its predecessor URESA, provided a
means for a custodial spouse to initiate in a court in his or her
own jurisdiction a petition for determination of a support award
or for enforcement of a prior support order. Still, there was
little relief in the nonsupport arena.
B. The Federal Government Moves Aggressively into the Support
Arena
While Minnesota and other states struggled in the 1960s and
into the 1970s with the mounting child support collection
problem, the federal government, which had always viewed the
support issue as local in nature," began to change its perspec-
tive. For example, in 1975, Congress added Title IV-D to the
Social Security Act."1  Title IV-D mandates that every state
operate a child support enforcement program providing free
49. RURESA was adopted in the following states: FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 88.011-.371
(West 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 19-11-40 to -81 (1991 & Supp. 1994); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 576-1 to -42 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-1048 to -1089 (1990 & Supp. 1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 750, 11 20/1-20/42 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE
§§ 252A.1-.25 (1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-451 to -491 (1988); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 407.010-.480 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984 & Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:1641-:1698 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995), §§ 13:1641-1644, repealed by 1993 La. Acts
442, § 3, eff. June 9, 1993; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 331-420 (West 1981 & Supp.
1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.151-.174 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); MINN. STAT.
§§ 518C.01-.36 (1992), repealed by Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, ch. 630, art.
9, § 4, 1994 Minn. Laws 1815, 1837; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-5-101 to -199 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 42-762 to -7104 (1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546:1-:41 (1974 & Supp.
1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A-4-30.24 to -30.64 (West 1987 & Supp. 1994): N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-6-1 to -41 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52A-1 to -32 (1994); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-12.1-01 to -43 (1991 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3115.01-.34
(Anderson 1989 & Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 301-344 (West 1990); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 110.005-.291 (1989); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4501-4540 (1991 &
Supp. 1994); R-I. GEN. LAws §§ 15-11-1 to -42 (1988 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 20-7-960 to -1170 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-9A-1 to -43
(1992); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 21.01-.66 (West 1986 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN.
it. 15, §§ 385-428 (1989 & Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-88.12 to -88.31 (Michie
1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 48A-7-1 to -41 (1992); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 767.65 (West 1993);
WYo. STAT. §§ 20-4-101 to -138 (1994).
50. Margaret C. Haynes, Child Support and the Courts in the Year 2000, 17 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 693, 693 (1994).
51. Id. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337,
2351 (1975) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-655 (1988)).
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child support enforcement services to recipients of AFDC and
Medicaid or lose federal funding. 2  By 1980, every state,
territory, and the District of Columbia had a child support
enforcement agency in place.53
A mechanism to intercept tax refunds at the federal level
became available in 1981"4 and was strengthened in 1984."5
In 1984, 1986, and 1988, Congress passed a series of measures
aimed at encouraging uniformity in the collection area. For
example, states were required (1) to allow paternity to be
established at any time prior to a child's eighteenth birthday;56
(2) except in unusual circumstances, to set child support awards
pursuant to a state child support guideline;57 (3) to process
cases expeditiously through quasi-judicial or administrative
processes;5s (4) to enforce support orders by withholding the
ordered support from the obligated parent's wages before
arrears accrued ("immediate wage withholding");59 and (5) to
collect arrearage by withholding state income tax refunds,' the
imposition of liens on real and personal property,6' and gar-
nishment.62  States that refused to follow federal mandates
risked loss of federal funds.63
Congress established a federal Parent Locator Service, which
52. Charlotte L. Allen, Federalization of Child Support: Twenty Years and Counting, 73
MIcH. B.J. 660, 660 (1994).
53. Id. The Minnesota Office of Child Support Enforcement is located in the
Department of Human Services. A child support (Title IV-D) office is located in each
of the 87 Minnesota counties.
54. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. XXIII,
ch. 2, § 2331, 95 Stat. 357, 860 (1981) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c)
(1994), 42 U.S.C. § 664 (1988)).
55. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, § 21,
98 Stat. 1305, 1322 (1984) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6402(c) (1994), 42
U.S.C. § 664 (1988)).
56. Diane Dodson & Robert M. Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of
1984; New Tools for Enforcement, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 3051, 3060 (Oct. 23,
1984). See also 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) (listing these and several other required state
laws).
57. Dodson & Horowitz, supra note 56, at 3059.
58. Id. at 3058.
59. Id. at 3051-52.
60. Id. at 3057.
61. Id. at 3055-57.
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was used to track down delinquent obligors.64 Congress also
authorized the IRS to intercept federal tax returns to pay off
child support arrears and to use its collection resources in
particularly difficult cases.'
In response to federal pressure, Minnesota passed an arsenal
of collection laws including income withholding, 6 garnish-
ment,67  contempt of court, tax refund interception,
69
liens,70 and security bonds.7' New administrative procedures
were created 72 and special statutes like the Uniform Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments Act 73 were adopted. The nonsup-
port problem, however, continued.
C. The U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support
By the late 1980s, there was nationwide frustration over the
inability of parents to support their children following divorce or
to support those born out-of-wedlock. Baffled by the states'
failure to effectively remedy the problem, Congress decided to
aggressively attack the problem. In 1988, as a part of the Family
Support Act, Congress established the U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support. 74 The Commission was charged with
investigating and making recommendations to Congress on the
interstate aspects of child support.75  After more than three
64. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, § 453, 88 Stat.
2337, 2353 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1988)). The Parent
Locator Service is used to "obtain and transmit to any authorized person ...
information as to the whereabouts of any absent parent when such information is to be
used to locate such parent for the purpose of enforcing support obligations against such
parent." Id. § 653(a). The state works in conjunction with the Department of Health
and Human Services, which can search federal agency records. Id. § 653(b). The
Department of Health and Human Services can pass along any information that does
not endanger national security. Id. § 653(e).
65. See id. § 652(b).
66. See MINN. STAT. § 518.611 (1994).
67. See id. § 518.611, subd. 1.
68. See id. § 518.615.
69. See id. § 518.551.
70. See id. § 518.57.
71. See id. § 257.66.
72. See id. § 548.26.
73. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, ch. 51, 1977 Minn. Laws 95
(codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 548.26-.33 (1994)).
74. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 3. See Family Support Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 126, 102 Stat. 2343, 2354 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666 (1988)).
75. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 3.
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years of work, the Commission issued its report in 1992.76
The report painted a bleak picture of parental nonsupport
in America. The Commission had found both unexplained long
delays when one state asked another to establish child sugport
under URESA and confusion over states' record keeping.
Responding states estimated that it took an average of eight
months to establish paternity and four months to establish
support in an interstate dispute.78 Initiating states disagreed,
claiming that responding states took eleven months to establish
paternity and eight months to establish support.79
Child support caseworkers and custodial parents testified
before the Commission to a lack of cooperation and communica-
tion between states.8 ° They reported that responding states
often refused to talk with parents who called the enforcement
offices directly about the status of their support request.81 The
parents testified that they were told to get information from the
initiating state.82 Caseworkers testified that if they were in an
initiating state they often were not allowed to speak with the
attorney in the responding state who was to prosecute the
case. 83  Responding states complained that initiating states
failed to timely assist them with discovery requests or provide
notice of hearing dates to the petitioner.84
The Commission also reported that most states were not
consistent in their support enforcement practices or procedures.
For example, the Commission found that in most states, despite
a petition seeking enforcement of an existing order, the
responding court proceeded de novo, apparently giving the
petition little or no weight.85 The Commission found that
responding courts applied their own support guidelines to the
parties' financial circumstances, not those of the initiating state
where the child lived.86 Consequently, a final child support
76. Id. at 231.






83. Id. at 229-30.
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order might be for a support amount that was the same, higher,
or lower than the amount that the obligee would have received
were the action in the initiating state where the minor child
lived. 7
The Commission found that even the process surrounding
registration of a support order was filled with confusion. The
confusion arose when an obligee sought enforcement through
registration of a support order and the registering tribunal
registered the order "intact."88  As a result, identical orders
existed in the registering state and in the original rendering
state.8 9 However, under the 1968 version of URESA, which
authorized states to prospectively modify a registered order,
courts allowed the underlying order to be modified." Conse-
quently, an obligee who registered a support order in a state for
enforcement risked "losing" the terms of the original order.
9 1
The Commission was persuaded that URESA, which was last
revised in 1968, had fallen badly out of date.92 Witnesses
argued that URESA no longer reflected the transformation that
child support had undergone since the enactment in 1975 of
Title IV-D of the Social Security Act.9
The Commission was told that Title IV-D had a profound
but uneven effect on the processing of URESA cases.94 Some
states no longer provided the out-of-state petitioner with a
government attorney unless the case was Title IV-D because it
was believed that IV-D status was necessary for the state to receive
Federal Financial Participation for the attorney's salary and
incentives based on the support collections.95
The emergence of Title IV-D had at times created a
confusing bureaucracy for processing URESA cases.96  For
example, in some states one governmental agency processed
URESA cases involving IV-D AFDC custodial parents, another







93. Id. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Title IV-D.
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custodial parents, and the clerk of court's office processed non-
IV-D URESA cases. 7 Procedures varied not only from state to
state but also from county to county within a state."
Commission witnesses also testified that URESA was in some
instances overused." In 1950, when URESA was first approved,
it was one of the few remedies available to enforce child support
across state lines."° Now, however, a number of remedies to
seek support existed, some of which were more efficient that
URESA.'°'
The Commission believed that the major limitation of
URESA was the result of its being a "uniform act.' 0 2 Because
it was a uniform act, states had the discretion whether to enact
all or only portions of it.' Although URESA had been enact-
ed in every state and American territory, in the District of
Columbia, and in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, problems
arose because each jurisdiction passed a different version. 4
For example, some states had a 1958 version, a majority had the
1968 version, and other states had bits and pieces of each
URESA version. 5 States such as Iowa, New York, and Ohio
had enacted a form of URESA that is known as the Uniform
Support of Dependents Law."0 6 The lack of uniformity made
it difficult to know what to expect when a URESA petition was
forwarded to a responding state.'0 7
In 1988, the U.S. Commission on Interstate Child Support
established a drafting committee to revise child support legisla-
tion.'0 8 Members of the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws participated in almost every drafting
committee meeting.0 After three and a half years of delibera-
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the Commission recommended adoption of the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act, as promulgated in 1992 by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws."' This message reached Minnesota, and the scene was
set for legislative action.
D. Minnesota's Legislature Acts to Adopt and Implement UIfSA
Many factors influenced the Minnesota Legislature as it
began its UIFSA deliberations. First, the U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support had already issued an extensive report
on interstate support. 2 Second, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had unanimously voted
to replace RURESA with UIFSA. 3 Third, UIFSA had been ap-
proved by the American Bar Association at its meeting in Boston,
Massachusetts, on February 9, 1993."' Finally, eight states had
already passed a UIFSA statute" 5 and eight other states and
the District of Columbia were considering it.
1 6
The Minnesota Legislature began hearings on UIFSA on
March 8, 1994.17 From the day it was introduced until its final
passage, there is little evidence that serious questions were raised
regarding the Act.' The legislature's political posture, as
gleaned from audio tape recordings of hearings held on March
8, 14, 16, and 28, 1994, and from the discussion on the floor of
the Senate, was to model Minnesota's UIFSA on the model act
recommended by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws with as few changes as possible.' 9 The
focus was on the need to obtain child support in the interstate
context and on the need for nationwide uniformity.
20
Constitutional issues, especially relating to the jurisdictional
111. Id.
112. See supra part II.C.
113. See supra note 6.
114. See supra note 7.
115. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr, Table of Jurisdictions, 9 U.L.A. 121
(Supp. 1994) (listing Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, Oregon, Texas,
and Washington).
116. In addition to Minnesota, UIFSA was pending in California, Illinois, Kansas,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. Elrod, supra note
7, at 485 n.30. UIFSA has also been considered in the District of Columbia. Id.
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section of the model act, were not addressed. 121  Moreover,
there is some evidence that legislators either misunderstood or
were misled regarding the current position of the judiciary in
the procedural due process area. For example, one spokesman
for the bill suggested during the hearings that the proposal
"takes advantage of some of the more recent United States
Supreme Court cases on long-arm jurisdiction,"112 implying
that there had been a change on the question of personal
jurisdiction over obligors. However, little change had occurred
in the personal jurisdiction arena at either the national 121 or
state level. 24 There is sparse evidence that the legislators were
aware of the conflict between UIFSA's language and existing
Minnesota views on procedural due process in the interstate
context. 25  UIFSA sailed through the Minnesota House and
Senate and was signed into law without opposition.
Coincidental with the passage of UIFSA, the legislature
strengthened the power of administrative judges to hear child
support disputes. 126 The legislature declared that all proceed-
ings for obtaining, modifying, or enforcing child and medical
121. See id.
122. Id. (audio tape statement of Bob Tennesson, Minnesota Uniform Law
Commissioner, before the Senate Committee on Family Services).
123. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985) (applying
long-arm statute to out-of-state franchises does not violate due process); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980) (holding that residents of
New York who bought a car in New York could not sue car retailer in Oklahoma for
injuries that occurred in Oklahoma); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978)
(holding that sending daughter to live with mother in California is not purposefully
availing self of state protections and does not create personal jurisdiction); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that Florida does not have in rem
jurisdiction over trust created in Delaware even though grantor lived and died in
Florida).
124. See, e.g., Bjordahl v. Bjordahl, 308 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Minn. 1981) (indicating
nonsupport is considered "an act outside the state causing injury or damage inside the
state"; thus subjecting the obligor to the tort long-arm statute) (quoting MINN. STAT.
§ 543.19, subd. 1(d) (1980)); Ulmer v. O'Malley, 307 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn. 1981)
(holding that personal jurisdiction does not exist where the defendant's only contact
to the state was through his attorneys); Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co., 257 Minn. 487,
496, 102 N.W.2d 293, 300 (1960) (holding that the authorization to accept service of
process does not extend to actions for fraud); Thelen v. Thelen, 75 Minn. 433, 435, 78
N.W. 108, 109 (1899) (holding that a divorce cannot be granted in a state where
neither party is domiciled or a resident); Wilkie v. Allied Vanlines, Inc. 398 N.W.2d 607,
610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that lack of contacts will eliminate use of long-arm
statute).
125. See Hearings, supra note 9.
126. See MINN. STAT. § 518.5511 (1994).
1006 [Vol. 21
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/1
MINNESOTA ADOPTS UIYSA
support orders and for modifying maintenance orders if
combined with a child support proceeding could be conducted
by an administrative judge when the public authority is a party
or provides services to a party or parties to the proceedings.
1 2 7
At the option of the county, the administrative process may
include contempt motions or actions to establish parentage. 2
Furthermore, after August 1, 1994, all Minnesota counties are re-
quired to participate in the administrative process in accordance
with a statewide implementation plan to be created by the
Commissioner of Human Services.129 The legislation contin-
ued the shift of child support matters away from Minnesota's
constitutionally established judiciary toward legislatively created
administrative judges.
Concurrent with the passage of UIFSA, the legislature
amended Minnesota Statute Section 518.11. The new language
provides for an alternative means of service of process in divorce
actions."13 The meaning of the language contained in the
amendment is not clear. The amendment may, but probably
does not, establish a substitute service of process procedure that
gives Minnesota personal jurisdiction over defendants where
personal service is impossible or impractical. It may be a veiled
127. Id. § 518.5511, subd. 1(b).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 518.5511, subd. 1(d).
130. The language added to Minnesota Statutes Section 518.11 reads as follows:
(c) If personal service cannot be made, the court may order service of the
summons by alternate means. The application for alternate service must
include the last known location of the respondent; the petitioner's most recent
contacts with the respondent; the last known location of the respondent's
employment; the names and locations of the respondent's parents, siblings,
children, and other close relatives; the names and locations of other persons
who are likely to know the respondent's whereabouts; and a description of
efforts to locate those persons.
The court shall consider the length of time the respondent's location has
been unknown, the likelihood that the respondent's location will become
known, the nature of the relief sought, and the nature of efforts made to
locate the respondent. The court shall order service by first class mail,
forwarding address requested, to any addresses where there is a reasonable
possibility that mail or information will be forwarded or communicated to the
respondent.
The court may also order publication, within or without the state, but only
if it might reasonably succeed in notifying the respondent of the proceeding.
Also, the court may require the petitioner to make efforts to locate the
respondent by telephone calls to appropriate persons. Service shall be
deemed complete 21 days after mailing or 21 days after court-ordered
publication.
MINN. STAT. § 518.11(c) (1994).
19961 1007
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attempt to create personal jurisdiction in cases where a
defendant's behavior impliedly creates a waiver to a court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction.
There are several possible explanations for this amendment.
For example, in Dobkin v. Chapman,3' the New York Court of
Appeals upheld a court-ordered substitute service of process in
three automobile accident cases."3 2 The defendants had been
served by ordinary mail at their last known address and by
publication in the local newspaper. 133 The court ruled that
when the whereabouts of the defendants were unknown and
service in the manner attempted was the best the plaintiffs could
do under the circumstances, it would be unfair to plaintiffs and
harmful to the public interest if the court insisted on actual
notice or a high probability of actual notice. 134  The court
placed the blame on the defendants, who had not furnished the
plaintiffs with a correct address at the scene of the accident, as
required by New York law, or had failed to leave a forwarding
address.'35 An analogy in Minnesota could be made to cases
where the parties to a dissolution or parentage action initially
provided the court with their address and then move without
notifying a party. The failure to notify, it can be argued,
constituted a waiver. This analysis, however, is constitutionally
problematic.
The amendment may also be a legislative reaction to Peterson
v. Eishen, 1 6 where the court held that a ten-year-old paternity
judgment was void because the summons and complaint were
not served at Eishen's usual place of abode and Eishen did not
submit to the jurisdiction of the court when he took a blood
test.137 In October 1974, the county attorney's office had sent
a certified letter to Eishen at a North St. Paul address. Although
the letter was returned marked "undeliverable," the county
served a summons and complaint at the same address in 1982
because (1) Minnesota driver's license records showed Eishen
lived at the North St. Paul address as of January 31, 1975; (2)
131. 236 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1968).
132. Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d at 460.
133. Id. at 453-55.
134. Id. at 458.
135. Id. at 459.
136. 495 N.W.2d 223 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), affd, 512 N.W.2d 338 (Minn. 1994).
137. Peterson v. Eishen, 495 N.W.2d at 226.
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Minnesota Department of Revenue records listed the North St.
Paul address as Eishen's residence as of March 30, 1981; and (3)
an inquiry to the United States Post Office on June 11, 1982,
indicated Eishen received mail at the North St. Paul address.
138
The court rejected the county's claim that it could rely on this
information and that service of process was valid. 3 9  The
ruling may have triggered the legislation.
Another possible explanation for the amended service of
process provision can be found in the U.S. Commission on
Interstate Child Support's Report to Congress. In the Report,
the Commission urges that the address given by a party in a
parentage or support case should be considered the presumed
address of the party for the purpose of providing adequate
notice."' The Commission also urges that the presumptive
nature of the information and the consequences of not updating
it should be made explicitly clear to the parties when they are
before a tribunal.'41
Finally, the amendment may simply be intended as an
alternative to publication, which provides only limited jurisdic-
tion in a dissolution matter. However, without a clear legislative
record, one is left to speculate upon the true meaning of the
amended service of process statute.
III. SUMMARIZING UIFSA's MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES
UIFSA brings to Minnesota's interstate child support effort
a major program with many new and innovative features. Before
exploring each provision in detail, it may be helpful to provide
an overview.
To help novices as well as experienced drafters, UIFSA
contains a detailed outline of the requirements for drafting a
petition.42 A petition to establish or modify a support order
must be verified by the petitioner and provide information such
as the names, addresses, social security numbers, sex of the
obligor and obligee, and any other information which might
assist in locating or identifying the respondent. 4  In excep-
138. Id. at 224.
139. Id. at 225-26.
140. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 95.
141. Id.
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tional circumstances, and upon a finding that the health or
safety of a party or child would be put at risk with disclosure of
such identifying information, the court may order nondisclosure
of such information.
44
Access to the court system is guaranteed because a petition-
er is not required to pay filing fees and costs. 45 If the peti-
tioner prevails on his or her action, the obligor may be required
to pay the fees."4
Another provision prevents Minnesota from exercising its
traditional jurisdictional authority over a nonresident obligor or
obligee who visits the state. As a sovereign, Minnesota has
followed the nineteenth century view of personaljurisdiction that
gives a state personal jurisdiction over any individual served
within its boundaries. 147  Under UIFSA, however, Minnesota
gives immunity to a petitioner when participating in a UIFSA
proceeding in the state.' 48  Consequently, the petitioner's
appearance at such a proceeding does not confer personal
jurisdiction over the petitioner for another matter; 49 mere
presence of the petitioner in Minnesota does not make the
petitioner amenable to civil service of process while in the
state. 150
UIFSA attempts to work out the problems associated with
multistate conflict by providing that Minnesota may act as an
initiating or responding tribunal even when more than two states
are involved.' If proceedings are initiated in Minnesota after
similar proceedings are filed in another state, Minnesota can
exercise jurisdiction only if the petition is filed in Minnesota
before the expiration of time allowed to challenge jurisdiction
in the other state; the contesting party timely challenges
jurisdiction in the other state; and, if relevant, Minnesota is the
home state of the child.
152
144. Id. § 518C.312.
145. Id. § 518C.313(a).
146. Id. § 518C.313(b).
147. OLIPHANT, supra note 11, § 23.31. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S.
604, 612 (1990) (stating that the modem court's view of personal jurisdiction dates back
to the nineteenth century).
148. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.314(a) (1994).
149. Id. § 518C.314(a).
150. Id. § 518C.314(b).
151. See id. § 518C.203.
152. Id. § 518C.204(a).
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UIFSA also deals with the dilemma faced by a court in
determining which order to recognize when multiple orders
have been entered by a Minnesota court and a court of another
state. 153 If only one order has been issued, then it must be
recognized.5 4 If two or more orders have been issued, then
the one issued by the tribunal having continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction prevails. 5 If more than one state has continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction, then the order issued by the child's
current home state must be recognized, or, if there is no order
in the current home state, the most recent order must be
recognized.'56 If no state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction,
then a Minnesota court can issue an order157 and thereby gain
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 5
Under UIFSA, it is no longer necessary to register an order
or file a pleading with the Minnesota courts before a Minnesota
employer must respond to an income-withholding order from
another state. 59 This is viewed as a substantial improvement
over RURESA, where the other state was required to send an
order to the Minnesota Child Support Enforcement Unit, which
then had to initiate a formal legal action to implement it.1"°
However, merely because an out-of-state order can be
summarily enforced does not mean that a child support order
from another state cannot be registered in Minnesota for the
purpose of enforcement 16 1 or modification. 62  The proce-
dure for registering an order for enforcement is set out in detail
in UIFSA. 63 Once registered, the order may be enforced as
though it had been issued by a Minnesota court.' 6' Once the
order is registered, the registering tribunal must notify the
nonregistering party of the registration, 65 the effect of the
153. See id. § 518C.207 (a).
154. Id. § 518C.207(a)(1).
155. Id. § 518C.207(a) (2).
156. Id. § 518C.207(a) (3).
157. Id. § 518C.207(a) (4).
158. Id. § 518C.207(b).
159. See id. § 518C.501.
160. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.09
(1992)).
161. SeeMINN. STAT. § 518C.601 (1994).
162. See id. § 518C.609.
163. See id. § 518C.602.
164. Id. § 518C.603(b).
165. Id. § 518C.605(a).
19961
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registration, 166 and the procedure for contesting the registra-
tion."' An order may be registered for the purpose of modifi-
cation in the same manner as for enforcement."6
UIFSA insures that a minor with a child is not excluded
from maintaining a proceeding on behalf of his or her child. 69
UIFSA also creates special rules of evidence designed to ease
the burden of interstate litigation over child support.17 °
Buried among the multitude of new support provisions in
UIFSA is Minnesota's first family law long-arm statute.' 7 ' This
provision is intended to give Minnesota courts personal jurisdic-
tion over a nonresident that is as broad as constitutionally
permitted.1 72 The UIFSA drafters did not confine the scope of
the long-arm statute to merely child support disputes but
included child support, spousal support, parentage proceedings,
and maintenance and support modification actions.
73
Without a specific family law long-arm statute, Minnesota
courts have struggled with the question of whether they pos-
sessed statutory authority to extend their jurisdictional power to
out-of-state residents in certain types of support disputes. For
example, in Mahoney v. Mahoney, 74 the court of appeals sug-
gested that Minnesota did not have a long-arm statute for
general use in dissolution matters. 75 The Mahoney decision is
consistent with Ferguson v. Ferguson,76 in which the court said
that Minnesota did not have long-arm jurisdiction in child
support modification matters. 7 7  The UIFSA long-arm provi-
sions lays to rest any statutory questions raised by those decisions.
In those instances where long-arm jurisdiction cannot be
obtained over a nonresident obligor, UIFSA creates a two-state
support proceeding similar to RURESA
1 78
166. Id. § 518C.605(b)(1).
167. Id. § 518C.605(b) (2).
168. See id. § 518C.609.
169. See id. § 518C.302.
170. See id. § 518C.316.
171. See id. § 518C.201.
172. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1994).
173. Id.
174. 433 N.W.2d 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
175. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d at 118.
176. 411 N.W.2d 238 (Minn. 1987).
177. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 411 N.W.2d at 240.
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Portions of the UIFSAjurisdiction section have a theoretical
platform that could extend state court jurisdiction over
out-of-state citizens beyond the limitations imposed by the
United States Supreme Court in Kulko v. Superior Court.'7 9 The
theory is that Congress can delegate nationwide jurisdiction to
the states.8 ° Minnesota's UIFSA jurisdictional section contains
all the language necessary for implementation of such a
nationwide jurisdictional scheme should Congress choose to
implement it sometime in the future.
The threat of future congressional action, however, is not
the immediate concern. Rather, several jurisdictional provisions
found in UIFSA raise troubling questions. When federal and
state family lawjurisdictional decisions are compared with some
of the new UIFSAjurisdictional provisions, some thorny constitu-
tional problems appear.18 ' The source for these problems is
the eight jurisdictional long-arm provisions found in the model
act and incorporated without change into Minnesota's version of
UIFSA.1
8 2
UIFSA contains special rules of evidence and assistance with
discovery procedures. 8 3 In promulgating the evidentiary rules,
the Minnesota Legislature appears to have accepted the view that
interstate support disputes cannot be efficiently handled if
Minnesota continued to rely on traditional common law rules of
evidence. UIFSA contains what commentators to the model act
characterize as "innovative methods for gathering evidence in
interstate cases."
184
UIFSA expands the procedure for registration of a support
order issued by another state.' 85 Under RURESA, when a
support order was received from another state, it was common
practice to initiate a new suit to establish a support order.
8 6
This often led to differing support orders in separate jurisdic-
179. See id. § 201, 9 U.LA at 131; MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (1994).
180. Haynes, supra note 20, at 23. Under such an expanded long-arm jurisdiction,
the obligor would be financially liable in any state in which the obligor's child resided.
Id. at 23-24.
181. See infra part IV.B.1 for a discussion of these issues.
182. See infra part IV.B.1.
183. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.316, .318 (1994).
184. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 316 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1994).
185. SeeMINN. STAT. § 518C.401 (1994).
186. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 601 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 156 (Supp. 1994).
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tions and legal questions about which order was enforceable.'87
UIFSA eliminates this multiple-state registration and modification
problem by setting up a one-order system."8  Under the
one-order system, only an existing order can be enforced. 9
Under UIFSA, an existing order may be modified only if the
conditions set out in Minnesota Statutes Section 518C.611(a)
have been met. 9 ° All persons affected by the initial order
must have moved from the issuing state.' 9' The petitioner for
modification must also be a nonresident of the forum in which
modification is sought, 192 and the respondent must be subject
to jurisdiction in that forum.'93 This provision contemplates
that the issuing state has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
and that either the obligee or obligor may seek modification in
the other's state of residence. 94  This provision seeks to
achieve a "rough justice" between the parties by preventing a
litigant from seeking modification in a court that will markedly
disadvantage the other party. 1
95
The parties may terminate the issuing state's continuing
jurisdiction by agreement. 196 The agreement must be initiated
and confirmed by the issuing state, and a copy of the agreement
must be filed with the issuing tribunal.'97
It should be noted that there are jurisdictional differences
between a child support modification matter brought under
UIFSA and one in which the federal Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act is invoked.'98 The federal Parental Kidnapping




190. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.611 (1994).
191. Id. § 518C.611(a)(1)(i).
192. Id. § 518C.611(a)(1)(ii).
193. Id. § 518C.611 (a) (1) (iii); see also Scott v. Scott, 492 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992).
194. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 163, 164 (Supp.
1994).
195. Id.
196. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611(a)(2) (1994).
197. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.LA 163, 164 (Supp.
1994).
198. Id. at 164-65.
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exclusive jurisdiction may "decline" jurisdiction. 99 The privi-
lege of declining jurisdiction is not permitted under UIFSA.2°
Minnesota may now use UIFSA to bring a parentage action
in the interstate context." Either the mother or father
claiming parentage may bring such an action." 2 It need not
be joined with a claim for support, although a parentage action
normally seeks to establish a support order under UIFSA.2 °3
UIFSA has many other features that in some respects make
it a revolutionary statute. These features are examined in detail
in the following sections. It should be noted that Minnesota
courts have generally found uniform statutory schemes like
UIFSA remedial in nature and have liberally construed
them .204
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE
FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
A. General Provisions
1. Section 51 8C. 101: Definitions
In this chapter:
(a) "Child" means an individual, whether over or under the
age of majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of
support by the individual's parent or who is or is alleged to
be the beneficiary of a support order directed to the parent.
(b) "Child support order" means a support order for a child,
including a child who has attained the age of majority under
the law of the issuing state.
(c) "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or
imposable by law to provide support for a child, spouse, or
former spouse, including an unsatisfied obligation to provide
support.
199. Id. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-611, §§ 6-10,
94 Stat. 3566, 3568-3573 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)). Similar provisions can
be found in the Uniform Child CustodyJurisdiction Act. Id. See UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION ACT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 292 (1988).
200. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.LA. 163, 164-65 (Supp.
1994).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.701 (a) (1994).
202. See id.
203. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 701 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 166 (Supp. 1994).
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(d) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with
a parent or a person acting as parent for at least six consecu-
tive months immediately preceding the time of filing of a
petition or comparable pleading for support and, if a child is
less than six months old, the state in which the child lived
from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence
of any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other
period.
(e) "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitlement
to money from any source and any other property subject to
withholding for support under the law of this state.
(f) "Income-withholding order" means an order or other legal
process directed to an obligor's employer or other debtor
under section 518.611 or 518.613, to withhold support from
the income of the obligor.
(g) "Initiating state" means a state in which a proceeding
under this chapter or a law substantially similar to this
chapter, the uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act,
or the revised uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act
is filed for forwarding to a responding state.
(h) "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in an
initiating state.
(i) "Issuing state" means the state in which a tribunal issues
a support order or renders a judgment determining parent-
age.
(j) "Issuing tribunal" means the tribunal that issues a support
order or renders a judgment determining parentage.
(k) "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and rules and
regulations having the force of law.
(1) "Obligee" means:
(1) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is
alleged to be owed or in whose favor a support order has
been issued or a judgment determining parentage has
been rendered;
(2) a state or political subdivision to which the rights
under a duty of support or support order have been
assigned or which has independent claims based on
financial assistance provided to an individual obligee; or
(3) an individual seeking a judgment determining
parentage of the individual's child.
(m) "Obligor" means an individual, or the estate of a
decedent:
(1) who owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
(2) who is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a
[Vol. 211016
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parent of a child; or
(3) who is liable under a support order.
(n) "Petition" means a petition or comparable pleading used
pursuant to section 518.551, subdivision 10.
(o) "Register" means to file a support order or judgment
determining parentage in the office of the court administra-
tor.
(p) "Registering tribunal" means a tribunal in which a
support order is registered.
(q) "Responding state" means a state to which a proceeding
is forwarded under this chapter or a law substantially similar
to this chapter, the uniform reciprocal enforcement of
support act, or the revised uniform reciprocal enforcement of
support act.
(r) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in
a responding state.
(s) "Spousal support order" means a support order for a
spouse or former spouse of the obligor.
(t) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any territory
or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. "State" includes an Indian tribe and a foreign
jurisdiction that has established procedures for issuance and
enforcement of support orders that are substantially similar
to the procedures under this chapter.
(u) "Support enforcement agency" means a public official or
agency authorized to:
(1) seek enforcement of support orders or laws relating
to the duty of support;
(2) seek establishment or modification of child support;
(3) seek determination of parentage; or
(4) locate obligors or their assets.
(v) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or order,
whether temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the
benefit of a child, spouse, or former spouse, which provides
for monetary support, health care, arrearages, or reimburse-
ment, and may include related costs and fees, interest,
income withholding, attorney's fees, and other relief.
(w) "Tribunal" means a court, administrative agency, or
quasi-judicial entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify
support orders or to determine parentage.0 5
205. MINN. STAT. § 518C.101 (1994).
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Section 518C.101 contains a host of definitions not found in
prior law.2 6 The major changes are discussed below.
Subsections (a) and (b) broadly define "child," without
elaborating on the age of majority. This allows Minnesota to
enforce decrees from other jurisdictions where'the age of
majority differs from Minnesota's. Although the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution established
eighteen as the voting age in state and federal elections, states
remain free to promulgate their own definitions of majority for
child support purposes. 7
Subsection (c) retains the scope of prior Minnesota law,208
while making it clear that UIFSA can be used in maintenance
and child support actions. It also makes clear that UIFSA may
be used to collect any unsatisfied support obligations. Before
UIFSA, Minnesota had broadly defined a support obligation as
one arising from a "divorce, separation, separate maintenance or
otherwise." 2°  "Otherwise" was interpreted as encompassing
URESA proceedings.210 The duty to support under prior and
present law continues even if child support has not yet been
imposed, has been suspended, or at some point eliminated.1
Minnesota's strong public policy is illustrated by Douglas
County Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Cavegn. The custodi-
al mother refused the father visitation with the couple's minor
206. Compare id. with RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 518C.02 (1992)).
207. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subd. 2 (1994) (defining "child" as an
"individual under 18 years of age, an individual under age 20 who is still attending
secondary school, or an individual who, by reason of physical or mental condition, is
incapable of self-support"). A court may extend child support beyond the age of
majority if it finds "a demonstrated inability of the 18-year-old, still in high school, to
be self supporting." Welsh v. Welsh, 446 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
208. Prior law defined the duty of support to mean a
duty of support, whether imposed or imposable by law or by order, decree or
judgment of a court, whether interlocutory or final, or whether incidental to
an action for divorce, separation, separate maintenance or otherwise and
includes the duty to pay arrearages of support past due and unpaid, as well as
the duty to provide medical, health, or dental insurance or support.
RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.02, subd. 3 (1992)).
209. Id.
210. Douglas County Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Cavegn, 420 N.W.2d 244,
245-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
211. Wisconsin ex rel. Doucette v. Kraskey, 496 N.W.2d 425, 427 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
212. 420 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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child and moved to Wisconsin after she was held in contempt for
interfering with the father's visitation efforts.2 13 The court
held that, despite the mother's conduct, Wisconsin was not
precluded from bringing a support action on behalf of the
minor child against the Minnesota father.2 14
Subsection (d) borrows the concept of the "home state" of
a child from the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, which
has been adopted in all fifty states, and from the federal Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act.
215
Subsection (f) provides that Minnesota must recognize
another state's direct income withholding by an obligor's
employer based on "other legal process."216 It is intended that
recognition not be limited to those cases where an order has
been recognized as an income withholding order.1 7
While subsections (g) and (h) provide definitions for an
"initiating state" and an "initiating tribunal," the Act allows an
obligee to file an interstate action in the responding state
without first filing with an initiating tribunal.18
Subsection (k) defines "law" broadly and is similar to the
definition under RURESA.
219
The language in subsection (t) allows Minnesota to enforce
a support order from another jurisdiction even though the
jurisdiction has not enacted UIFSA.22 ' The reciprocity re-
quired under former law is no longer required.221
Subsection (u) includes within its definition Minnesota's
213. Douglas County Child Support Enforcement Unit v. Cavegn, 420 N.W.2d at
245-46.
214. Id. at 246.
215. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 128 (Supp. 1994).
See MINN. STAT. § 518A.02(e) (1994) (defining "home state").
216. MINN. STAT. § 518C.101(f) (1994).
217. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 128 (Supp. 1994).
"Federal law requires that each state provide for income withholding 'without the
necessity of any application therefor... or for any further action ... by the court or
other entity which issued such order.'" Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 666(b) (2) (1988)).
218. Id. Subsections (q) and (r) are written to permit the direct filing of a petition
without the intervention of an initiating tribunal. Id. at 129.
219. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.02, subd.
6 (1992) (defining "law" as both statutory and common law)).
220. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 101 cmL, 9 U.L.A. 128, 129 (Supp.
1994).
221. Id. See Nicol v. Tanner, 310 Minn. 68, 69 n.1, 256 N.W.2d 796, 797 n.1 (1976)
(construing URESA as including "any foreignjurisdiction" if the foreignjurisdiction had
a substantially similar reciprocal law for enforcement of child support obligations).
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Title IV-D agency,2 22 the Department of Human Services.
Subsection (w) replaces the formerly restrictive definition of
"court"223 with a broader definition that encompasses a court,
administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity. This change
allows the existing centralized administrative lawjudge system to
continue hearing support matters.
2. Section 518C.102: Tribunal of This State
A court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity
authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or
to determine parentage are tribunals of this state.
224
This section identifies the courts and administrative agencies
that constitute the tribunal authorized to determine family
support matters. It is a broad grant of authority.
3. Section 518C. 103: Remedies Cumulative
Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not
affect the availability of remedies under other law.
225
UIFSA does not create an exclusive process that must be
followed where there are other available remedies. 26
B. Jurisdiction
1. Section 518C.201: Bases for Jurisdiction Over Nonres-
ident
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support
order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may
exercise personaljurisdiction over a nonresident individual or
the individual's guardian or conservator if:
(1) the individual is personally served with a summons or
222. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of Title IV-D.
223. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.02, subd.
2 (1992)).
224. MINN. STAT. § 518C.102 (1994).
225. Id. § 518C.103.
226. The UIFSA drafting committee gave the following example to illustrate the
meaning of this rule: "[A] petitioner may decide to file an action directly in the state
of residence of the respondent under the generally applicable support law, thereby
submitting to the personal jurisdiction of that forum, and forego reliance on the Act."
UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 103 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 131 (Supp. 1994).
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comparable document within this state;
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state
by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by
filing a responsive document having the effect of waiving
any contest to personal jurisdiction;
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state;
(4) the individual resided in this state and provided
prenatal expenses or support for the child;
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts or
directives of the individual;
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this
state and the child may have been conceived by that act
of intercourse;
(7) the individual asserted parentage under sections
257.51 to 257.75; or
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the consti-
tutions of this state and the United States for the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction.2 7
This section contains many new and far-reaching provisions
not found in prior Minnesota law. It creates a long-arm statute
that gives Minnesota courts jurisdiction over a nonresident
respondent for the purposes of establishing a child support
order; determining parentage; and, in a limited fashion,
establishing maintenance.2
Before this provision became law, Minnesota did not have
a long-arm statute directed specifically at child support, mainte-
nance, and parentage matters. Rather, Minnesota courts
struggled to find sufficient linguistic justification in its tort
long-arm statute to give district courts personal jurisdiction
outside Minnesota in domestic disputes. 229 The tort statute has
227. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (1994).
228. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1994).
229. The courts used Minnesota Statutes Section 543.19, which provided:
As to a cause of action arising from any acts enumerated in this subdivision,
a court of this state with jurisdiction of the subject matter may exercise
personal jurisdiction over ... any nonresident individual ... in the same
manner as if ... the individual were a resident of this state. This section
applies if, in person or through an agent, the... nonresident individual:
(a) Owns, uses, or possesses any real or personal property situated in this
state, or
(b) Transacts any business within the state, or
(c) Commits any act in Minnesota causing injury or property damage, or
(d) Commits any act outside Minnesota causing injury or property
damage in Minnesota ....
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been interpreted as covering service on out-of-state defendants
in paternity actions with the "tort" construed as a failure to
provide child and spousal support. 30 However, the same "tort"
went undiscovered in dissolution actions when modification of
an existing child support award was sought.3 ' Hopefully,
UIFSA will put an end to the confusion surrounding the
jurisdictional questions in this area.
It should be noted that, although it is not expressly stated,
Subsections (1), (2), and (8) can also be applied to maintenance
obligations.3 2 The power to assert jurisdiction over support
issues under UIFSA, however, does not extend a tribunal's
jurisdiction to other matters.23  UIFSA's long-arm power is
limited by the grant of jurisdiction found in this section.
Minnesota Statute Section 518C.201 incorporates without
change all eightjurisdictional long-arm provisions recommended
and adopted by the United States Commission on Interstate
Child Support and by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws.234 The provisions were incorporat-
ed into Minnesota law apparently without regard for the state's
present view regarding their constitutionality. Each of the eight
subsections found in Minnesota Statute Section 518C.201 is
examined below.
a. Subsection (1)
Subsection 518C.201 (1) gives Minnesota jurisdiction over a
nonresident citizen when an "individual is personally served with
a summons or comparable document within this state."23 5 This
MINN. STAT. § 543.19, subd. 1 (1994).
230. See, e.g., State ex rel. Nelson v. Nelson, 298 Minn. 438, 216 N.W.2d 140 (1974).
In this parentage case, the court observed,
Contrary to the defendant's contention, complainant mother has indeed
suffered injury, for quite apart from the physical and emotional trauma of
bearing the child and rearing it alone, she is faced with the financial burdens
of medical and hospital bills. She is also confronted with the expense of
rearing their child and possible impairment of her earning power.
Id. at 442, 216 N.W.2d at 143.
231. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 411 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. CL App. 1987) (holding
court did not have personal jurisdiction over a Montana resident).
232. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1994).
233. Id.
234. Compare MINN. STAT. § 518C.201 (1994) with UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILYSUPPORT
ACT § 201, 9 U.LA 132 (Supp. 1994).
235. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(1) (1994).
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provision raises no newjurisdictional issues for Minnesota judges
and lawyers because it codifies Burnham v. Superior Court.
23 6
Burnham reaffirmed the constitutional validity of the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident based solely
upon personal service within a state. 37
b. Subsection (2)
Subsection 518C.201(2) provides that Minnesota has
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen if the "individual
submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering
a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having
the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction." 
2
This subsection expresses the principle that a nonresident party
concedes personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief or by
submitting to the jurisdiction by answer or entering an appear-
ance. It is a widely accepted jurisdictional principle that a party
requesting affirmative relief from a court submits himself or
herself to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal. 9  Conse-
quently, this section should not create problems, unless the
"filing a responsive document" language is interpreted differently
from existing law, which is unlikely. It should be noted that the
Minnesota Court of Appeals has held that an assertion of a
cross-claim does not constitute a waiver to a properly raised
jurisdictional defense grounded in the constitutional right to due
process.2 0
c. Subsection (3)
Subsections 518C.201 (3) through (8) are derived from the
Uniform Parentage Act, the Texas Family Code, and the New
236. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.LA. 132 (Supp.
1994).
237. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990); see generally Forward to
The Future of PersonalJuisdiction: A Symposium on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 559 (1991) (summarizing the holding and facts of the Burnham case); PatrickJ.
Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to
Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 78-87 (1990) (discussing the
development of personal jurisdiction and the Burnham holding).
238. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(2) (1994).
239. JohnJ. Sampson, Uniform InterstateFamily Support Act (with Unofficial Annotations),
27 FAM. L.Q. 93, 115 n.50 (1993).
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York Family Court Act.241  Subsection 3 gives Minnesota per-
sonal jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen if "the individual
resided with the child in this state."242 This provision raises a
technical concern regarding the meaning of "resided." Does the
term mean to establish a residence? If so, Minnesota Statutes
Section 518.003 defines residence as "the place where a party has
established a permanent home from which the party has no
present intention of moving." 21 Or, does "resided" simply
mean living in the state for a period of time without an intent to
make it a permanent place of abode? The commentary to this
section provides no guidance; consequently, one will have to wait
for the courts to provide guidance.
Another technical concern involves the residence of a child.
Minnesota takes the view that because children are legally
incapable of forming the intent necessary to establish a domicile,
they take the same domicile as their parents." If a child is
born out-of-wedlock, the child normally takes the domicile of its
mother.245  If the mother's residence is different from that of
the alleged putative father, which residence governs? Once
again, there is no guidance provided in UIFSA for determining
the answer to this question.
d. Subsection (4)
Subsection (4) gives Minnesota jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent citizen where "the individual resided in this state and
provided prenatal expenses or support for the child."21 Once
the technical definition of "resided" is resolved, the remaining
language seems consistent with existing Minnesota law. For
example, in Impola v. Impola,47 the court held that the petition-
er had sufficiently established injury-the nonsupport of ex-wife
and child-within Minnesota to justify the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the ex-husband even though he was living in
Texas. 2 8 The court observed that the birth of the couple's
241. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1994).
242. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(3) (1994).
243. Id. § 518.003, subd. 2 (1994). This is the traditional definition of domicile.
244. See, e.g., In re Pratt, 219 Minn. 414, 421, 18 N.W.2d 147, 152 (1945).
245. Id. at 421, 18 N.W.2d at 152.
246. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(4) (1994).
247. 464 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
248. Impola v. Impola, 464 N.W.2d at 300.
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child and the ex-wife's injury occurred while the respondent was
a resident of Minnesota. 49 The court stated that it was "criti-
cally important" that the conception took place in Minnesota;
that the putative father acknowledged paternity within Minneso-
ta; and that the alleged father was a resident when the child was
conceived, during the pregnancy, and at times thereafter.25 °
e. Subsection (5)
Subsection (5) declares that Minnesota has personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen if "the child resides in this
state as a result of the acts or directives of the individual."25 '
This provision raises personal jurisdictional questions, the
answers to which turn on how Minnesota courts interpret the
"acts or directives" language. In Kulko v. Superior Court,252 the
United States Supreme Court held that the mere presence of
children in a state does not give that state jurisdiction over their
noncustodial nonresident parent.25' The fact that the child in
Kulko moved to California with her father's permission was not
considered by the Court a sufficient "act or directive" to give
California jurisdiction over the out-of-state father.254
In a Minnesota parentage action, Brown County Family Service
Center v. Miner,55 the alleged father of a child born to a wom-
an in Minnesota had never physically been within the state. 56
During the mother's pregnancy, however, he sent letters to her
in Minnesota and also made a few telephone calls to her
Minnesota home.2 57  The court of appeals held that these
contacts were not sufficient to give Minnesota personal jurisdic-
249. Id. at 299.
250. Id.; see also Brown County Family Serv. Ctr. v. Kahoun, 427 N.W.2d 20, 22-23
(Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
251. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(5) (1994).
252. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
253. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 100-01. In Kulko, Appellant and
Respondent, a husband and wife, were New York residents. Id. at 86. Respondent
moved to California after separation, and Appellant remained in New York. Id. at 88.
Respondent served Appellant with child support and divorce papers. Id. The Supreme
Court reasoned that just because Appellant agreed to send his daughter to school in
California, he had not "'purposefully availed himself' of the 'benefits and protections'"
of the state. Id. at 94. Thus, no personal jurisdiction existed. Id.
254. Id. at 93-94.
255. 419 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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tion over the father as the contacts failed to satisfy the constitu-
tionally mandated minimum contacts test.25 The court noted
that the father could not have anticipated being required to
defend a paternity action in Minnesota based on a few phone
calls and letters sent to Minnesota addresses.2 59 The court also
noted that the alleged father's contacts with Minnesota were not
directly connected to the underlying action and did not occur
until eight months after the contact that led to the paternity
260action.
The new UIFSA provision leaves the meaning of "act or
directive" open to judicial interpretation on a case-by-case basis.
Initially, the provision appears to conflict with Kulko and existing
Minnesota law.26'
f Subsection (6)
Subsection (6) declares that Minnesota courts may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen if "the individual
engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child may
have been conceived by that act of intercourse. '26 2 In Sherburne
County Social Services v. Kennedy,263 the alleged father engaged
in a single act of consensual intercourse with the mother while
both were residents of Minnesota. 64 Shortly after the incident,
258. Id. at 119.
259. Id.
260. Id. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1985) (holding
that a contract to own a franchise in a foreign state establishes minimum contact
necessary for long-arm jurisdiction); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (holding that foreseeability of causing injury in a forum state is
insufficient for granting long-arm jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (holding that due process commands that a potential defendant should
reasonably anticipate out-of-state litigation before long-arm jurisdiction is granted);
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-21 (1945) (holding that a
corporation's act of conducting business in state through its agents established presence
sufficient for in personam jurisdiction).
261. See West American Ins. Co. v. Westin, Inc. 337 N.W.2d 676, 679-80 (Minn.
1983) ("Minnesota's interest in providing a forum, standing alone, does not support the
attempted exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. In essence, this
consideration is the precise opposite to the correct form of analysis."); Ulmer v.
O'Malley, 307 N.W.2d 775, 777 (Minn. 1981) (holding no jurisdiction over defendant
father who had cooperated with requests of adoption agency in Minnesota but had not
visited Minnesota).
262. MINN. STAT. § 518C.201(6) (1994).
263. 409 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987), affd, 426 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 1988).
264. Sherburne County Social Servs. v. Kennedy, 409 N.W.2d at 908.
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the alleged father moved to Montana. 65  Several more inci-
dents of intercourse occurred in Montana, one which allegedly
led to a pregnancy.2" Following the birth of a child in Minne-
sota, a Minnesota parentage action was begun against the alleged
father to determine responsibility for medical expenses related
to the birth and to establish child support.267 The court of
appeals held that while the long-arm statute applied, neither the
nature nor the quality of the contact satisfied due process.2
Kennedy does not necessarily bar an action under UIFSA where
the conception occurs within the state. The Act distinguishes
between intercourse as a contact and conception.
g. Subsection (7)
Subsection (7) gives Minnesota jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent if the individual claims parentage under Minnesota Statute
Sections 257.51 to 257.75. Subsection (7) assumes that Minneso-
ta maintains a putative father registry, and the subsection is
intended to give Minnesota jurisdiction over any putative father.
Subsection (7) links personal jurisdiction to the use of the
Recognition of Parentage form269 developed by the Depart-
ment of Human Services and sent to all hospitals in the state.
By signing the form, a biological father gives up the right to have
blood or genetic testing to prove that he is not the biological
father, the right to a trial to determine if he is the biological
father of the child, and the right to have an attorney represent
him in a parentage action.
h. Subsection (8)
This subsection "tracks the broad, catch-all provisions found
in many state statutes."271 Standing alone, this provision was




268. Id. at 908-10.
269. MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., RECOGNITION OF PARENTAGE, FORM DHS-
3159 (November 1993).
270. See id. The "Waiver of Rights" contained on the back of the Recognition of
Parentage form states, "By signing this Recognition of Parentage form, the parents give
up the rights listed above." Id. The jurisdictional waiver is incorporated by language
found in Section 518C.201 (7).
271. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 132 (Supp. 1994).
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v. Superior Court.272  Consequently, this section does not give
Minnesota courts additional jurisdictional power over out-of-state
citizens.
The language in the subsection to the effect that Minnesota
may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident citizen if
"there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this
state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion"273 has no meaning unless Congress mandates that each
state adopt UIFSA and then delegates a portion of its jurisdic-
tional power to the states. To do this, Congress must make
findings consistent with its constitutional powers274 that due
process is satisfied when the state where a child is domiciled
asserts jurisdiction over the nonresident party.275 The United
States Supreme Court must then overrule Kulko v. Superior
Court.
276
2. Section 518C.202: Procedure When Exercising
Jurisdiction over Nonresident
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident under section 518C.201 may apply section
518C.316 to receive evidence from another state, and section
518C.318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another
state. In all other respects, sections 518C.301 to 518C.701 do
not apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and
substantive law of this state, including the rules on choice of
law other than those established by this chapter.277
When Minnesota initiates a support action against a
nonresident, the action is essentially a one-state proceeding
despite the fact that the parties involved in the dispute reside in
272. Id. Kulko v. Superior Court can be found at 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
273. MINN. STAT. § 518C.210(8) (1994).
274. Congress must make findings consistent with its powers contained in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Commerce Clause, the
General Welfare Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Supremacy Clause.
275. Haynes, supra note 20, at 23 ("Congress could.., declare that due process is
satisfied when a child support action is brought where the child resides, regardless of
the noncustodial parent's contacts with the forum state.").
276. In Kulko, the Court held that the mere act of sending a child to California to
live with her mother does not provide in personam jurisdiction over the father, a New
York domiciliary. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 101.
277. MINN. STAT. § 518C.202 (1994).
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different states.27' But for the two exceptions found in this
section, Minnesota must apply its own procedural and substantive
law, including its rules on choice of law other than those estab-
lished by the Act.
The two exceptions to this general rule involve the use of
evidence and discovery. Section 202 permits Minnesota tribunals
to utilize the special rules of evidence and procedures found in
Section 316 of the Act, resulting in a kind of two-state effort. 9
The two-state discovery procedures of Section 318 of the Act are
also made applicable to a one-state proceeding when a foreign
tribunal can assist a Minnesota tribunal in that process.28 0 The
exceptions are intended to facilitate interstate exchange of
information and to enable nonresidents to fully participate
without requiring the nonresident to appear in the state.28 '
3. Section 518C.203: Initiating and Responding
Tribunal of This State
Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an
initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another state
and as a responding tribunal for proceedings initiated in
another state.282
This section provides that a Minnesota court may in certain
circumstances act as an initiating or responding tribunal even
when two or more states are involved. If proceedings are
initiated in Minnesota after similar proceedings have been filed
in another state, Minnesota can exercise jurisdiction only if (1)
the petition is filed in Minnesota before the time expires in the
other state to challenge jurisdiction; (2) the contesting party
timely challenges jurisdiction in the other state; and (3) if
relevant, Minnesota is the home state of the child.28 3




282. MINN. STAT. § 518C.203 (1994).
283. Id. § 518C.204(a). The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws felt that it was necessary to provide a new procedure in order to eliminate
the multiple orders that were common under URESA. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmL, 9 U.L.A. 134 (Supp. 1994).
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4. Section 518C.204: Simultaneous Proceedings in
Another State
(a) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to
establish a support order if the petition or comparable
pleading is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is
filed in another state only if:
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in this state is
filed before the expiration of the time allowed in the
other state for filing a responsive pleading challenging
the exercise of jurisdiction by the other state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of
jurisdiction in the other state; and
(3) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
(b) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to
establish a support order if the petition or comparable
pleading is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is
filed in another state if:
(1) the petition or comparable pleading in the other
state is filed before the expiration of the time allowed in
this state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the
exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
(2) the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of
jurisdiction in this state; and
(3) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the
child.284
Rather than applying a "first filing" approach, such as that
used by the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, to resolve
jurisdictional disputes, UIFSA establishes priority for the tribunal
in the child's home state. s5 Only if there is no home state
does "first filing" control.
2 86
5. Section 518C.205: Continuing, Exclusive Jurisdiction
(a) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent
with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over a child support order:
284. MINN. STAT. § 518C.204 (1994).
285. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 134 (Supp. 1994).
The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act also chooses the home state of the
child to establish priority. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c) (A) (1994).
286. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 204 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 134 (Supp. 1994).
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(1) as long as this state remains the residence of the
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose
benefit the support order is issued; or
(2) until each individual party has filed written consent
with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another
state to modify the order and assume continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction.
(b) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order
consistent with the law of this state may not exercise its
continuing jurisdiction to modify the order if the order has
been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a
law substantially similar to this chapter.
(c) If a child support order of this state is modified by a
tribunal of another state pursuant to a law substantially
similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this state loses its
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective
enforcement of the order issued in this state, and may only:
(1) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts
accruing before the modification;
(2) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and
(3) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that
order which occurred before the effective date of the
modification.
(d) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has
issued a child support order pursuant to a law substantially
similar to this chapter.
(e) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending
resolution of a jurisdictional conflict does not create continu-
ing, exclusive jurisdiction in the issuing tribunal.
(f) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent
with the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over a spousal support order throughout the existence of the
support obligation. A tribunal of this state may not modify a
spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state
having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order
under the law of that state.
28 7
Subsection (a) "establishes the principle that the issuing
tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
287. MINN. STAT. § 518C.205 (1994).
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support order except in very narrowly defined circumstan-
ces." 288  For example, a narrowly defined circumstance exists
when all the parties and the child reside elsewhere.8 9 Child
support orders may be modified on the agreement of both
parties or if all relevant persons (the obligor, obligee, and child)
have left the issuing state. 90 Modification requires, however,
that the tribunal have personal jurisdiction over the respon-
dent.
291
Subsection (f) prohibits Minnesota from modifying an
existing maintenance order from another state. This is a
departure from RURESA, which treated maintenance and child
support orders identically.29 2 The model act's drafting commit-
tee gave three reasons for giving child support and maintenance
different consideration. First, under RURESA, interstate modifi-
cation of maintenance had been rare.293 Second, "prohibition
of modification of spousal support is consistent with the basic
principle that a tribunal should apply local law if at all possi-
ble., 294 Third, because the standards for modification of child
support and maintenance differ substantially, a dramatic
improvement in the obligor's economic circumstances would
have little impact on a maintenance modification action, but it
would have an impact on the child support award. 95
6 Section 518C.206: Enforcement and Modification of
Support Order by Tribunal Having Continuing
Jurisdiction
(a) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal
to request a tribunal of another state to enforce or modify a
support order issued in that state.
(b) A tribunal of this state having continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a support order may act as a responding
288. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 135 (Supp. 1994).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 136.
291. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611(a)(1) (1994).
292. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 205 cmt., 9 U.LA 135, 136 (Supp.
1994).
293. Id.
294. Id. This was designed to insure efficient handling of cases and to minimize
choice of law problems. Id.
295. Id. The comments also state that the disparity "is founded on a policy choice
that post-divorce success should benefit the obligor's child, but not an ex-spouse." Id.
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tribunal to enforce or modify the order. If a party subject to
the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal no
longer resides in the issuing state, in subsequent proceedings
the tribunal may apply section 518C.316 to receive evidence
from another state and section 518C.318 to obtain discovery
through a tribunal of another state.
(c) A tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction over a spousal support order may not serve as a
responding tribunal to modify a spousal support order of
another state.296
Section 206 is the "correlative" of the exclusive jurisdictional
model asserted in Section 205.97 Subsection (a) of the model
act requires that the enacting state recognize the continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction of other tribunals over support orders. 98
It authorizes the initiation of requests for modification to the
issuing state.299 Subsection (b) makes it clear that the power
to modify a child support order rests with the issuing state,
"provided it retains a sufficient nexus with its order."3" That
nexus is defined as "any situation in which the child or at least
one of the parties continues to reside in the issuing state."3"'
Subsection (c) requires Minnesota courts to adhere to the
"one-order-at-a-time system" in maintenance disputes.0 2
7. Section 518C.207: Recognition of Child Support
Orders
(a) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and one or
more child support orders have been issued in this or
another state with regard to an obligor and a child, a tribunal
of this state shall apply the following rules in determining
which order to recognize for purposes of continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction:
(1) If only one tribunal has issued a child support order,
the order of that tribunal must be recognized.
(2) If two or more tribunals have issued child support
296. MINN. STAT. § 518C.206 (1994).
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orders for the same obligor and child, and only one of
the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdic-
tion under this chapter, the order of that tribunal must
be recognized.
(3) If two or more tribunals have issued child support
orders for the same obligor and child, and more than
one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under this chapter, an order issued by a
tribunal in the current home state of the child must be
recognized, but if an order has not been issued in the
current home state of the child, the order most recently
issued must be recognized.
(4) If two or more tribunals have issued child support
orders for the same obligor and child, and none of the
tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
under this chapter, the tribunal of this state may issue a
child support order, which must be recognized.
(b) The tribunal that has issued an order recognized under
paragraph (a) is the tribunal having continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction. 3
Section 207 deals with the problem created by multiple
orders. If multiple orders exist and none can be distinguished
as being in conflict with UIFSA, an order issued by the child's
home state has the highest priority.30 4 Should more than one
of these orders exist, priority goes to the most recent order.0 5
If no priority exists under the statutory scheme, the forum
tribunal must issue a new order.0 6
Section 207 is not without doubt. Orders that are issued by
state courts must be given full faith and credit by other
307states. This guarantees that one state's lawful exercise of
jurisdiction over a United States resident will be recognized by
another state. 0 8 Consequently, Section 207 does not attempt
to interfere with the enforcement of accrued arrearage.
However, it does establish a system for prospective enforcement
303. MINN. STAT. § 518C.207 (1994).
304. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Ar § 207 cmt., 9 U.LA. 138 (Supp. 1994).
305. Id.
306. Id.
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of competing orders.3 0 9
8. Section 518C.208: Multiple Child Support Orders for
Two or More Obligees
In responding to multiple registrations or petitions for
enforcement of two or more child support orders in effect at
the same time with regard to the same obligor and different
individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a
tribunal of another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce
those orders in the same manner as if the multiple orders
had been issued by a tribunal of this state.310
This provision requires that Minnesota tribunals give equal
weight to one or more foreign support orders that involve two
or more families of the same obligor. To handle the practical
difficulties when such support orders exceed the maximum
allowed for income withholding,"' the orders are considered
as issued by a Minnesota tribunal.
9. Section 518C.209: Credit for Payments
Amounts collected and credited for a particular period
pursuant to a support order issued by a tribunal of another
state must be credited against the amounts accruing or
accrued for the same period under a support order issued by
the tribunal of this state.1 2
Section 209 is essentially the same as previous law.
313
Under the one-order scheme of UIFSA, only one state acts as the
issuing tribunal. However, because it will take time to fully
implement the one-state scheme on a national level, it was felt
"necessary to continue to mandate pro tanto credit for actual
309. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 207 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 138 (Supp. 1994).
310. MINN. STAT. § 518C.208 (1994).
311. The federal government requires that states cap the maximum withheld from
an obligor in accordance with the employer withholding requirements set forth in 42
U.S.C. § 666(b) (6) (A) and the wage garnishment requirements set forth in 15 U.S.C.
§ 1673(a). UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 208 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 138 (Supp.
1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (1994).
312. MINN. STAT. § 518C.209 (1994).
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payments made against all existing orders."31 4
C. Civil Provisions of General Application
1. Section 518C.301: Proceedings Under This Chapter
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, sections
518C.301 to 518C.319 apply to all proceedings under this
chapter.
(b) This chapter provides for the following proceedings:
(1) establishment of an order for spousal support or
child support pursuant to section 518C.401;
(2) enforcement of a support order and income-with-
holding order of another state without registration
pursuant to sections 518C.501 and 518C.502;
(3) registration of an order for spousal support or child
support of another state for enforcement pursuant to
sections 518C.601 to 518C.612;
(4) modification of an order for child support or spousal
support issued by a tribunal of this state pursuant to
sections 518C.203 to 518C.206;
(5) registration of an order for child support of another
state for modification pursuant to sections 518C.601 to
518C.612;
(6) determination of parentage pursuant to section
518C.701; and
(7) assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant
to sections 518C.201 and 518C.202.
(c) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency
may commence a proceeding authorized under this chapter
by filing a petition in an initiating tribunal for forwarding to
a responding tribunal or by filing a petition or a comparable
pleading directly in a tribunal of another state which has or
can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent."1 5
The details found in Section 301 were included because the
drafting committee believed that the majority of persons
administering the Act would not be attorneys and therefore
needed as much assistance as possible.316
314. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 209 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 139 (Supp. 1994).
315. MINN. STAT. § 518C.301 (1994).
316. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301 cmt., 9 U.L.A 139, 139-40 (Supp.
1994) (commenting that this section, although unusual for a uniform act, serves as a
"road map" indicating the types of actions authorized by UIFSA).
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Subsection (a) requires application of the general provisions
of the chapter to all UIFSA proceedings.317 Subsection (b)
declares that child support and spousal maintenance orders are
to be handled in essentially the same manner under Chapter
518C.3 " However, Subsection (b) (5) limits modification of
support orders to those involving children. 3 9  A second state,
as noted above, may not modify a spousal support order.32°
Subsection (c) is derived from the two-state procedure estab-
lished under RURESA. 2'
2. Section 518C.302: Action by Minor Parent
A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative
of a minor parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of
or for the benefit of the minor's child. 2
Section 302 is essentially the same as previous law.323  It
permits a minor to maintain an action without appointment of
a guardian ad litem, even if the law of the jurisdiction requires
such appointment for in-state cases.32 4
3. Section 518C.303: Application of Law of This State
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding
tribunal of this state:
(1) shall apply the procedural and substantive law,
including the rules on choice of law, generally applicable
to similar proceedings originating in this state and may
exercise all powers and provide all remedies available in
those proceedings; and
(2) shall determine the duty of support and the amount
payable in accordance with the law and support guide-
lines of this state. 25
317. Id. at 140.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See supra part IV.B.5.
321. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 301 cmt., 9 U.LA 139, 140 (Supp.
1994); see also RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.06
(1992)).
322. MINN. STAT. § 518C.302 (1994).
323. SeeRURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.08 (1992)
(petition for a minor)).
324. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 302 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 140 (Supp. 1994).
325. MINN. STAT. § 518C.303 (1994).
1996] 1037
49
Oliphant: Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interst
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
WIL/JAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Section 303 gives Minnesota, as the forum state, the same
powers in an action involving interstate parties as it does in
intrastate disputes. 26  It does not significantly alter prior
law.3
27
4. Section 518C.304: Duties of Initiating Tribunal
Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an
initiating tribunal of this state shall forward three copies of
the petition and its accompanying documents:
(1) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support
enforcement agency in the responding state; or
(2) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown,
to the state information agency of the responding state
with a request that they be forwarded to the appropriate
tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.2
Section 304 alters previous law, which required that the
initiating court find that the petition set forth facts from which
it may be determined that the obligor owes a duty of sup-
port.3 29 Under the new law, the initiating tribunal no longer
is required to make a preliminary finding.33° Its role is purely
ministerial in that it simply forwards the documents to the
responding tribunal.33
5. Section 518C.305: Duties and Powers of Responding
Tribunal
(a) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a
petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal
or directly pursuant to section 518C.301, paragraph (c), it
shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the
petitioner by first class mail where and when it was filed.
326. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 303 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 141 (Supp. 1994).
327. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.04 (1992)
(declaring that "[t]he rules of civil procedure for district court apply to proceedings"
under RURESA)).
328. MINN. STAT. § 518C.304 (1994).
329. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.09 (1992)
(stating that the initiating court possesses duty to determine whether support is owed)).
330. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 304 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 141 (Supp. 1994).
331. Id. (citing Mossburg v. Coffman, 629 P.2d 745, 748 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Neff
v. Johnson, 391 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1965)).
(Vol. 21
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/1
MINESOTA ADOPTS UIFSA
(b) A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent other-
wise authorized by law, may do one or more of the following:
(1) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child
support order, or render a judgment to determine
parentage;
(2) order an obligor to comply with a support order,
specifying the amount and the manner of compliance;
(3) order income withholding;
(4) determine the amount of any arrearages, and specify
a method of payment;
(5) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
(6) set aside property for satisfaction of the support
order;
(7) place liens and order execution on the obligor's
property;
(8) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of
the obligor's current residential address, telephone
number, employer, address of employment, and tele-
phone number at the place of employment;
(9) issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed
after proper notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the
tribunal and enter the bench warrant in any local and
state computer systems for criminal warrants;
(10) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment
by specified methods;
(11) award reasonable attorney's fees and other fees and
costs; and
(12) grant any other available remedy.
(c) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a
support order issued under this chapter, or in the documents
accompanying the order, the calculations on which the
support order is based.
(d) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the
payment of a support order issued under this chapter upon
compliance by a party with provisions for visitation.
(e) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order
under this chapter, the tribunal shall send a copy of the
order by first class mail to the petitioner and the respondent
and to the initiating tribunal, if any."'2
332. MINN. STAT. § 518C.305 (1994).
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This section changes prior law.33  Under UIFSA, the
physical seizure of an obligor is left to the procedures available
under existing Minnesota law, as in other civil cases.
334
Subsection (c) mandates that support calculation sheets be
included with a support order.3 5
Subsection (d) declares that Minnesota may not condition
payment of a support order issued under Chapter 518C upon a
party's compliance with visitation provisions.3 6 Minnesota,
along with a majority ofjurisdictions, takes the position that the
noncustodial parent may not withhold child support because the
custodial parent has interfered with visitation.31 7  The welfare
of the child is viewed as the primary consideration in a support
proceeding.3 38 A child will be protected as much as possible
from being deprived of support because of a dispute between
parents.
339
State ex rel. Sauer v. Hellesvig ' illustrates the concern the
courts have over ensuring that minor children receive support.
Hellesvig, a former United States serviceman, acknowledged
paternity of a child born to a West German resident.341 The
West German government petitioned St. Louis County, Minneso-
ta, under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
333. SeeRURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.11 (1992)
(jurisdiction by arrest), § 518C.12 (1992) (duty of court and prosecuting attorney),
§ 518C.17 (1992) (order of support), and § 518C.27 (1992) (payments)).
334. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 305 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 142 (Supp. 1994).
335. Id. at 142-43.
336. Id. at 143.
337. See England v. England, 337 N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. 1983) (citing Minnesota
Statutes Section 518.612 to support the conclusion that the Minnesota Legislature does
not allow interference with visitation as a defense for failing to provide support
payments); Colorado ex rel. McDonnell v. McCutcheon, 337 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Minn.
1983) (holding that deprivation of visitation is not a proper factor to consider in deter-
mining what level of support is appropriate).
Minnesota Statutes Section 518.612 states in part:
[I]nterference with visitation rights or taking a child from this state without
permission of the court or the noncustodial parent [is not] a defense to
nonpayment of support.
MINN. STAT. § 518.612 (1994).
338. State ex rel. Sauer v. Hellesvig, 376 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
339. Wisconsin ex rel. Southwell v. Chamberland, 361 N.W.2d 814, 816-17 (Minn.
1985) (noting that children should not be pawns in a struggle between parents and that
a child should not be affected because one parent violates a decree).
340. 376 N.W.2d 503 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
341. State ex reL Sauer v. Hellesvig, 376 N.W.2d at 504.
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(URESA), to enforce Hellesvig's child support obligations.34
The West German government notified St. Louis County and
Hellesvig that the child's mother forbade visitation with the
daughter.343 A support order was issued requiring Hellesvig to
support the child.3 " When compliance with the support order
became erratic, a show cause order was issued requiring that
Hellesvig explain why he should not be held in contempt and
why child support payments should not be withheld from his
wages.34' Hellesvig attacked the show cause order on the
ground that Minnesota Statute Section 518.612 was unconstitu-
tional.3' He claimed that because he had no legal remedy to
secure visitation with his daughter, he should not be required to
support her.347 While the court did not address the constitu-
tional challenge directly, it held that Hellesvig could not raise
interference with visitation as a defense to the support order.
3 48
6. Section 518C.306: Inappropriate Tribunal
If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an
inappropriate tribunal of this state, it shall forward the
pleading and accompanying documents to an appropriate
tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner
by first class mail where and when the pleading was sent.
349
This section directs a Minnesota tribunal that erroneously




345. Id. at 505.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id. In its analysis in Helesvig, the court observed that the case did not present
any facts that would allow a Minnesota court to assume jurisdiction over visitation rights
under Minnesota Statutes Section 518A.03, which contains the jurisdictional provisions
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Id. The court pointed out
that the child had never been present in Minnesota, Minnesota was not the child's
home state, the best interests of the child did not require that Minnesota assume
jurisdiction, and evidence regarding the child's welfare was not available here. Id. at
505-06. One or more of these factors must be present in order for Minnesota to assume
jurisdiction under the UCCJA. Id. Finally, merely because Minnesota had participated
in a URESA proceeding with the West German government did not confer jurisdiction
on the Minnesota court over the parties (the mother and illegitimate child) in another
proceeding. Id.
349. MINN. STAT. § 518C.306 (1994).
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tribunal. The mandate applies regardless of whether Minnesota
is a responding or initiating tribunal.
7. Section 518C.307: Duties of Support Enforcement
Agency
(a) A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request,
shall provide services to a petitioner in a proceeding under
this chapter.
(b) A support enforcement agency that is providing services
to the petitioner as appropriate shall:
(1) take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate
tribunal in this state or another state to obtain juris-
diction over the respondent;
(2) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time,
and place for a hearing;
(3) make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant
information, including information as to income and
property of the parties;
(4) within two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays, after receipt of a written notice from an
initiating, responding, or registering tribunal, send a
copy of the notice by first class mail to the petitioner;
(5) within two days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays, after receipt of a written communication
from the respondent or the respondent's attorney, send
a copy of the communication by first class mail to the
petitioner; and
(6) notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respon-
dent cannot be obtained.
(c) This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of
attorney and client or other fiduciary relationship between a
support enforcement agency or the attorney for the agency
and the individual being assisted by the agency.
35 0
This subsection substantially changes existing Minnesota law.
Under the previous statutory language, the focus was on
providing an obligee with assistance. 5 ' When the legislature
350. MINN. STAT. § 518C.307 (1994).
351. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.07 (1992)
("If this state is acting as an initiating state, the prosecuting attorney shall represent the
obligee in a proceeding under sections 518C.01 to 518C.36."), § 518C.12, subd. 2
(1992) ("The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute the case diligently, taking all action
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enacted UIFSA, it failed to change the word "petitioner," which
is used in the model act.352 Consequendy, either an obligor or
an obligee may request representation. The request may be in
the context of establishing an order, enforcing or reviewing an
existing order, or modifying an order.
353
Subsection (b) is intended to increase the amount of
information that a party receives during the pendency of a
UIFSA proceeding.
3 54
Subsection (c) provides little direction on the question of
when an attorney-client relationship is created.355 However,
there should be little question but that, when a support enforce-
ment agency attorney undertakes to advise either an obligee or
an obligor, an attorney-client relationship is created. 56
8. Section 518C.308: Duty of Attorney General
If the attorney general determines that the support enforce-
ment agency is neglecting or refusing to provide services to
an individual, the attorney general may order the agency to
perform its duties under this chapter or may provide those
services directly to the individual.357
necessary in accordance with the laws of this state to enable the court to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the obligor or the obligor's property.")).
352. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 307, 9 U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 1994);
see also Sampson, supra note 239, at 97 n.10, 134 n.96.
353. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 307 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 144 (Supp. 1994).
354. Id.
355. Id. (noting that the issue is controversial and is left to applicable state law).
356. Representing either an obligee or an obligor carries significant legal
consequences. For example, the legislature has provided for settlement or compromise
of paternity lawsuits and for the lump sum payment of child support. See MINN. STAT.
§§ 257.64, 257.66, subd. 4 (1994). See also Cox v. Slama, 355 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn.
1984) (holding that an attorney must be appointed to represent an indigent defendant
facing civil contempt for failure to pay child support when the court reaches a point in
the proceedings that incarceration is a real possibility); St. George v. St. George, 304
N.W.2d 640, 646 (Minn. 1981) (holding that a county attorney may represent a spouse
in a URESA action to enforce a maintenance obligation); Hepfel v. Bashaw, 279 N.W.2d
342, 348 (Minn. 1979) (establishing the right to counsel in paternity proceedings
because the adversarial nature of paternity adjudications requires protection of the
important interests involved); Illinois ex rel. Shannon v. Sterling, 248 Minn. 266, 274-76,
80 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn. 1956) (holding that an attorney in a URESA proceeding may
take all remedial steps which are ancillary to and reasonably necessary to obtain the
relief for which the proceedings were instituted, including requests for visitation and
custody); Nash v. Allen, 392 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a
county attorney could represent natural mother and county in a paternity action).
357. MINN. STAT. § 518C.308 (1994).
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This provision continues prior law without change. 58
Under prior Minnesota law, a county attorney could represent a
spouse in a URESA proceeding for enforcement of maintenance
obligations and visitation rights. 359 The court has also indicat-
ed that an attorney appearing for petitioner in a proceeding
under RURESA has implied authority to take all remedial steps
that are reasonable and necessary to obtain the relief for which
the proceedings were instituted." °
9. Section 518C.309: Private Counsel
An individual may employ private counsel to represent the
individual in proceedings authorized by this chapter.36'
This section recognizes the right of a person to employ
private counsel to handle a dispute under this chapter. Minne-
sota was one of only a handful of states that under RURESA had
expressly provided that private counsel may assist in filing an
interstate pleading.
62
10. Section 518C.310: Duties of State Information Agency
(a) The unit within the department of human services that
receives and disseminates incoming interstate actions under
title IV-D of the Social Security Act from section 518C.02,
subdivision la, is the state information agency under this
chapter.
(b) The state information agency shall:
(1) compile and maintain a current list, including
addresses, of the tribunals in this state which have
jurisdiction under this chapter and any support enforce-
ment agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the
state information agency of every other state;
358. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.07
(1992)).
359. St. George, 304 N.W.2d at 644.
360. Shannon, 248 Minn. at 274, 80 N.W.2d at 20.
361. MINN. STAT. § 518C.309 (1994).
362. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.23
(1992)); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1655 (West 1982) (stating that notwithstanding
other provisions, privately retained counsel may represent an obligee); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 576-25 (1993) (county attorney, corporation counsel, or attorney general may
represent child enforcement agency).
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(2) maintain a register of tribunals and support en-
forcement agencies received from other states;
(3) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the place in
this state in which the individual obligee or the obligor
resides, or in which the obligor's property is believed to
be located, all documents concerning a proceeding
under this chapter received from an initiating tribunal or
the state information agency of the initiating state; and
(4) obtain information concerning the location of the
obligor and the obligor's property within this state not
exempt from execution, by such means as postal verifica-
tion and federal or state locator services, examination of
telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address
from employers, and examination of governmental
records, including, to the extent not prohibited by other
law, those relating to real property, vital statistics, law
enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses,
and social security.36
This section continues the information-gathering duties of
a central agency that were found in prior law. 36  The Depart-
ment of Human Services is designated as the central agency in
Minnesota. 365
11. Section 518C.311: Pleadings and Accompanying
Documents
(a) A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support
order or to determine parentage in a proceeding under this
chapter must verify the petition. Unless otherwise ordered
under section 518C.312, the petition or accompanying
documents must provide, so far as known, the name, residen-
tial address, and social security numbers of the obligor and
the obligee, and the name, sex, residential address, social
security number, and date of birth of each child for whom
support is sought. The petition must be accompanied by a
certified copy of any support order in effect. The petition
may include any other information that may assist in locating
or identifying the respondent.
(b) The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition
363. MINN. STAT. § 518C.310 (1994).
364. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.02, subd.
la (1992)).
365. MINN. STAT. § 518C.310(a) (1994).
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and accompanying documents must conform substantially
with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by
federal law for use in cases filed by a support enforcement
agency.366
This section establishes the basic requirements for preparing
interstate pleadings.
12. Section 518C.312: Nondisclosure of Information in
Exceptional Circumstances
Upon a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the health,
safety, or liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably
put at risk by the disclosure of identifying information, or if
an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall order that the
address of the child or party or other identifying information
not be disclosed in a pleading or other document filed in a
proceeding under this chapter.
3 67
This section authorizes confidentiality when there is a
serious risk of domestic violence or child abduction." s
13. Section 518C.313: Costs and Fees
(a) The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or
other costs.
(b) If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal may assess
against an obligor filing fees, reasonable attorney's fees, other
costs, and necessary travel and other reasonable expenses
incurred by the obligee and the obligee's witnesses. The
tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the
obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the
initiating or the responding state, except as provided by other
law. Attorney's fees may be taxed as costs, and may be
ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the
order in the attorney's own name. Payment of support owed
to the .obligee has priority over fees, costs, and expenses.
(c) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and
reasonable attorney's fees if it determines that a hearing was
requested primarily for delay. In a proceeding under sections
518C.601 to 518C.612, a hearing is presumed to have been
366. Id. § 518C.311.
367. Id. § 518C.312.
368. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 312 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 147 (Supp. 1994).
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requested primarily for delay if a registered support order is
confirmed or enforced without change. 69
This provision alters previous law, which declared that an
"initiating court shall not require payment of either a filing fee
or other costs from the obligee, but may request the responding
court to collect fees and costs from the obligor."s7°  New
Subsection (a) recognizes that "under UIFSA either the obligor
or the obligee may file suit.""7 ' Either is permitted to file
without payment of a filing fee or other costs.
s 71
Subsection (b) continues existing law by allowing costs to be
assessed only against the obligor.373
14. Section 518C.314: Limited Immunity of Petitioner
(a) Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a
responding tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney,
or through services provided by the support enforcement
agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over the
petitioner in another proceeding.
(b) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process
while physically present in this state to participate in a
proceeding under this chapter.
(c) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to
civil litigation based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under
this chapter committed by a party while present in this state
to participate in the proceeding.3 74
This subsection will have little impact in Minnesota as it has
adopted a broad immunity perspective in support actions. For
example, in England v. England,3 75 the court held that submit-
ting to the jurisdiction of a Minnesota court for purposes of
recovering support under RURESA did not automatically subject
the spouse to a custody or visitation claim while seeking that
369. MINN. STAT. § 518C.313 (1994).
370. RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.10 (1992)).
371. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 313 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 148 (Supp. 1994).
372. Id.
373. Id.; see also RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C. 10
(1992)).
374. MINN. STAT. § 518C.314 (1994).
375. 337 N.W.2d 681 (Minn. 1983).
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support.-
76
Subsection (b) provides immunity from service of process
during the time a party is present in Minnesota.3 " Subsection
(c) withholds immunity in situations where litigation arises out
of actions committed by a party while present in Minnesota for
the child support litigation. 78
15. Section 518C.315: Nonparentage as Defense
A party whose parentage of a child has been previously
determined by or pursuant to law may not plead
nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding under this
chapter.
79
This section restates the basic principle of res judicata. In
State ex rel. Mart v. Mart,s"° the Minnesota Court of Appeals
held that an affirmative finding of paternity in a judgment and
decree of dissolution was res judicata, barring an asserted
defense of nonpaternity in a subsequent URESA action."' The
ruling occurred even though the husband had waived an issue
of paternity in exchange for an agreement with the wife
concerning custody and child support arrangements s82 A
collateral attack on a prior judgment cannot be made in a
UIFSA hearing. 1
3
16. Section 518C.316: Special Rules of Evidence and
Procedure
(a) The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding
tribunal of this state is not required for the establishment,
enforcement, or modification of a support order or the
rendition of a judgment determining parentage.
376. England v. England, 337 N.W.2d at 685.
377. See UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 314 cmt., 9 ULA 149 (Supp.
1994).
378. See id. For example, a petitioner who got into a brawl while appearing in
Minnesota on an obligation matter would not have immunity from a battery action
served while appearing in Minnesota.
379. MINN. STAT. § 518C.315 (1994).
380. 380 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
381. State ex rel. Mart v. Mart, 380 N.W.2d at 606. The action was brought under
prior law. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.07 (1984).
382. Mart, 380 N.W.2d at 605. See also State ex rel. Ondracek v. Blohm, 363 N.W.2d
113, 115 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
383. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 315 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 150 (Supp. 1994).
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(b) A verified petition, affidavit, document substantially
complying with federally mandated forms, and a document
incorporated by reference in any of them, not excluded
under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in
evidence if given under oath by a party or witness residing in
another state.
(c) A copy of the record of child support payments certified
as a true copy of the original by the custodian of the record
may be forwarded to a responding tribunal. The copy is
evidence of facts asserted in it, and is admissible to show
whether payments were made.
(d) Copies of bills for testing for parentage, and for prenatal
and postnatal health care of the mother and child, furnished
to the adverse party at least ten days before trial, are admissi-
ble in evidence to prove the amount of the charges billed and
that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
(e) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to
a tribunal of this state by telephone, telecopier, or other
means that do not provide an original writing may not be
excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means
of transmission.
(f) In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this state
may permit a party or witness residing in another state to be
deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or
other electronic means at a designated tribunal or other
location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate
with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate
location for the deposition or testimony.
(g) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to
answer on the ground that the testimony may be
self-incriminating, the trier of fact may draw an adverse
inference from the refusal.
(h) A privilege against disclosure of communications between
spouses does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter.
(i) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of
husband and wife or parent and child does not apply in a
proceeding under this chapter."s
This section contains special rules of evidence and assistance
with discovery procedures which expand prior law.' The
384. MINN. STAT. § 518C.316 (1994).
385. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.16
(1992)). According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, "'If the action was based on a
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Minnesota Legislature took the position in adopting this
provision that interstate support disputes cannot be efficiently
handled if Minnesota continued to rely upon traditional
common law rules of evidence. 86 Consequently, this section
contains what the commentators to the model act characterize
as "innovative methods for gathering evidence in interstate
cases."
387
The new rules are intended to eliminate potential hearsay
problems in interstate litigation.' The reason for this is that
the out-of-state party and the party's witnesses usually do not
appear in person at the UIFSA hearing.389 The United States
Commission on Interstate Child Support believed these eviden-
tiary provisions were crucial to facilitate establishment and
enforcement of interstate disputes.' °
Subsection (a) is self-evident in declaring that "the physical
presence of the petitioner in a responding tribunal of this state
is not required for the establishment, enforcement, or modifica-
tion of a support order or the rendition of ajudgment determin-
ing parentage."391
Subsections (b) through (f) substantially expand on previous
RURESA provisions.3 92  Subsection (b) provides for the admis-
support order issued by another court, a certified copy of the order shall be received
as evidence of the duty of support,'" subject only to defenses available to an obligor with
respect to paternity under Section 518C.18 or to a defendant in an action or a
proceeding to enforce a foreign money judgment. State ex rel. McDonnell v. Mc-
Cutcheon, 337 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1983) (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518C. 16 (1992)).
The court held that while a foreign order is evidence that the obligor's relationship to
the obligee gives rise to a duty to support, it does not compel a responding state to
award the same level of support. Id. The philosophy exhibited by the court in this
decision is counter to the new UIFSA provisions.
386. Prior law was governed by the Minnesota Rules of Evidence. See infra note 392.
387. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 316 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 151 (Supp. 1994).
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 2, at 234-35.
391. MINN. STAT. § 518C.316(a) (1994).
392. RURESA read as follows:
In any hearing for the civil enforcement of sections 518C.01 to 518C.36, the
court is governed by the Minnesota rules of evidence. If the action is based
on a support order issued by another court, a certified copy of the order shall
be received as evidence of the duty of support, subject only to defenses
available to an obligor with respect to paternity under section 518C.18 or to
a defendant in an action or a proceeding to enforce a foreign money judg-
ment. The determination or enforcement of a duty of support owed to one
obligee is unaffected by interference by another obligee with rights of custody
or visitation granted by a court.
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sibility of a verified petition, affidavits, and documents that
substantially comply with federally mandated forms. Subdivision
(c) provides for the admissibility of a certified copy of the most
recent record of child support payments.
Subsection (d) provides for the admissibility of copies of
bills for parentage testing and for prenatal and postnatal health
care of the mother and child, without the requirement of a
traditional evidentiary foundation."' 3 Under the new provision,
health care providers are not required to appear to testify that
the bills are reasonable and associated with necessary treatment
related to the birth of a child.394 Furthermore, there is no
need to obtain affidavits or business records from the provid-
ers. 95 Affidavits would, however, lend reliability to the submis-
sion of bills to the tribunal.
The problems inherent in understanding medical billing
practices in the United States adds another layer of difficulty to
this subsection. The prospect of numerous
ill-equipped-to-understand obligors appearing to defend
themselves pro se against the intricacies of medical billing
practice is troubling.
Subsection (e) provides for the admissibility of documentary
evidence transmitted from another state by telephone,
telecopier, or other means that does not provide an original
writing. Subsection (f) provides for the admissibility of testimony
by telephone or audiovisual conference.
Subsection (g) outlines the consequences to an alleged
obligor who asserts the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. This provision allows the trier of fact to draw
an adverse inference from the obligor's refusal, on Fifth
Amendment grounds, to answer questions put to him or her at
the UIFSA hearing. If one asserts the privilege of self-
incrimination, the judge can rule in favor of the other party
without further action. Minnesota has been one of the front-
runners in reducing the protection some thought was given a
RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.16 (1992)).
393. The drafting committee felt that these costs would not be in dispute in most
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citizen by this privilege. 96
The spousal immunity defense does not apply to proceed-
ings brought under Chapter 518C. 97
17. Section 518C.317: Communications Between
Tribunals
A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal of
another state in writing, or by telephone or other means, to
obtain information concerning the laws of that state, the legal
effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that tribunal, and
the status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of
this state may furnish similar information by similar means to
a tribunal of another state.398
This section anticipates broader cooperation between
tribunals involved in an interstate support dispute.39
18. Section 518C.318." Assistance with Discovery
A tribunal of this state may:
(1) request a tribunal of another state to assist in
obtaining discovery; and
(2) upon request, compel a person over whom it has
jurisdiction to respond to a discovery order issued by a
tribunal of another state."°
This broad provision is intended to encourage interstate
cooperation between the forum state and another state in the
discovery process."
396. See In reJ.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 883-84 (Minn. 1987) (holding that the privilege
applies in a neglect proceeding but does not protect against the possible adverse conse-
quences of a failure to undergo effective rehabilitative therapy); see also LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:396A (West 1992) (if a party refuses testing, the court can resolve questions
of paternity against that party); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-51(d) (West 1991) (a refusal to
submit to testing allows the presumption that the test would have had an unfavorable
result for the refusing party); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5104(c) (1991) (if a party
refuses to comply with paternity tests, the court can resolve it in favor of the other
party).
397. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.316(h) (1994).
398. Id. § 518C.317.
399. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 317 cmt., 9 U.LA 152 (Supp. 1994).
400. MINN. STAT. § 518C.318 (1994).
401. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 318 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
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19. Section 518C.319: Receipt and Disbursement of
Payments
A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall
disburse promptly any amounts received pursuant to a
support order, as directed by the order. The agency or
tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of
another state a certified statement by the custodian of the
record of the amounts and dates of all payments re-
ceived. °2
This subsection "confirms the duty of the agency or tribunal




D. Section 518C.401: Petition to Establish Support Order
(a) If a support order entitled to recognition under this
chapter has not been issued, a responding tribunal of this
state may issue a support order if:
(1) the individual seeking the order resides in another
state; or
(2) the support enforcement agency seeking the order is
located in another state.
(b) The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order
if:
(1) the respondent has signed a verified statement
acknowledging parentage;
(2) the respondent has been determined by or pursuant
to law to be the parent; or
(3) there is other clear and convincing evidence that the
respondent is the child's parent.
(c) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard,
that an obligor owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue
a support order directed to the obligor and may issue other
orders pursuant to section 518C.305.4°
This section gives Minnesota jurisdiction as a responding
state to issue temporary and permanent support orders as long
402. MINN. STAT. § 518C.319 (1994).
403. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 319 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 152 (Supp. 1994).
404. MINN. STAT. § 518C.401 (1994).
1996] 1053
65
Oliphant: Is Sweeping Change Possible? Minnesota Adopts the Uniform Interst
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
W/LLIAM MITCHELL LAW RE VWEW
as it has personal jurisdiction over the obligor. °5 Such orders
cannot be issued where an out-of-state tribunal has issued a
support order and has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter. °6 There is no requirement that an action for divorce
or legal separation be initiated. A spouse may initiate a UIFSA
action under certain circumstances, even though no action for
divorce or separation has been commenced and there is no
order regarding child custody or visitation."
Where Minnesota has continuing, exclusivejurisdiction over
the matter, the child support guidelines should be used to
establish the amount of support."°
E. Direct Enforcement of Order of Another State Without Registration
1. Section 518C.501: Recognition of Income-Withholding
Order of Another State
(a) An income-withholding order issued in another state may
be sent by first class mail to the person or entity defined as
the obligor's employer under section 518.611 or 518.613
without first filing a petition or comparable pleading or
registering the order with a tribunal of this state. Upon
receipt of the order, the employer shall:
(1) treat an income-withholding order issued in another
state which appears regular on its face as if it had been
issued by a tribunal of this state;
(2) immediately provide a copy of the order to the
obligor; and
(3) distribute the funds as directed in the withholding
order.
(b) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an
income-withholding order issued in another state in the same
manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of this
state. Section 518C.604 applies to the contest. The obligor
shall give notice of the contest to any support enforcement
405. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 401 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 153 (Supp. 1994).
406. Id.
407. See England v. England, 337 N.W.2d 681, 683-84 (Minn. 1983) (awarding
support via URESA even though no dissolution action had yet been brought).
408. See State ex rel. Meneley v. Meneley, 398 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(ruling that child support guidelines apply to RURESA proceedings where obligee was
receiving public assistance); Kusel v. Kusel, 361 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985)
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agency providing services to the obligee and to:
(1) the person or agency designated to receive payments
in the income-withholding order; or
(2) if no person or agency is designated, the obligee.'
It is no longer necessary to register an order or file a
pleading with the courts of this state in order to require a
Minnesota employer to act under an income-withholding order
from another state. This is viewed as a substantial improvement
over RURESA, where the other state was required to send the
order to the Minnesota Child Support Enforcement Unit, which
then had to initiate a formal legal action to implement the
order.410
Subsection (b) incorporates the law regarding the defenses
a Minnesota tribunal may consider in the interstate withholding
context.41' As a general proposition, states have accepted that
the only defense is one of "mistake of fact."
4 12
2. Section 518C.502: Administrative Enforcement of
Orders
(a) A party seeking to enforce a support order or an
income-withholding order, or both, issued by a tribunal of
another state may send the documents required for register-
ing the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
(b) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement
agency, without initially seeking to register the order, shall
consider and, if appropriate, use any administrative proce-
dure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a support
order or an income-withholding order, or both. If the
obligor does not contest administrative enforcement, the
order need not be registered. If the obligor contests the
validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the
support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant
to this chapter.13
409. MINN. STAT. § 518C.501 (1994).
410. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.09
(1992)).
411. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILYSUPPORT Acr § 501 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 154 (Supp. 1994).
412. Id. Mistake of fact apparently includes errors in the amount owed or the
mistaken identity of the obligor. Id.
413. MINN. STAT. § 518C.502 (1994).
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This section permits Minnesota to summarily enforce
another state's support order through any administrative means
available. 14 Under Subsection (a), any interested party in
another state, including a private attorney, may forward a
support order or income-withholding order to a Minnesota
enforcement agency.
4 15
Subsection (b) directs that the enforcement agency in
Minnesota use its normal administrative procedures to process
the out-of-state order.41 ' The purpose of this subsection is to
avoid the need for a Minnesota employer to learn new proce-
dures in order to comply with an out-of-state order.417
F Enforcement and Modification of Support Order After
Registration
1. Section 518C.601: Registration of Order for Enforce-
ment
A support order or an income-withholding order issued by a
tribunal of another state may be registered in this state for
enforcement.4 '
This section expands the procedures for registering a
foreign support order.419 The previous practice of initiating a
new lawsuit in Minnesota for the express purpose of establishing
a support order, despite the existence of an order in another
state, is discouraged. 420 It was felt that RURESA encouraged
initiation of these suits, and the resulting multiple orders in
different states created confusion.4 1 Under UIFSA, only the
existing order is to be enforced and then only if it was validly is-
sued.422  Consequently, registration should be used if an
out-of-state order is to be enforced in Minnesota.42 Personal




418. MINN. STAT. § 518C.601 (1994).
419. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 601 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 156 (Supp. 1994).
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. Minnesota can, however, modify the support order of another state, but
only under very limited conditions. See MINN. STAT. §§ 518C.609-.612 (1994).
423. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 601 cmt., 9 U.LA 156 (Supp. 1994);
see also State ex reL McDonnell v. McCutcheon, 337 N.W.2d 645, 650 (Minn. 1983)
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jurisdiction over the obligor is, of course, required before a
Minnesota court can enforce an out-of-state order.424
2. Section 518C. 602: Procedure To Register Order for
Enforcement
(a) A support order or income-withholding order of another
state may be registered in this state by sending the following
documents and information to the registering tribunal in this
state:
(1) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting
registration and enforcement;
(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders
to be registered, including any modification of an order;
(3) a sworn statement by the party seeking registration or
a certified statement by the custodian of the records
showing the amount of any arrearage;
(4) the name of the obligor and, if known:
(i) the obligor's address and social security number;
(ii) the name and address of the obligor's employer
and any other source of income of the obligor; and
(iii) a description and the location of property of
the obligor in this state not exempt from execution;
and
(5) the name and address of the obligee and, if applica-
ble, the agency or person to whom support payments are
to be remitted.
(b) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering
tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign judg-
ment, together with one copy of the documents and infor-
mation, regardless of their form.
(c) A petition or comparable pleading seeking a remedy that
must be affirmatively sought under other law of this state may
be filed at the same time as the request for registration or
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy
sought.
425
(holding that an obligee who seeks enforcement of an existing out-of-state support
order and who has not first reduced it tojudgment in the foreign state should register
the order as provided in URESA).
424. MINN. STAT. § 518C.607(a)(1) (1994); see also Scott v. Scott, 492 N.W.2d 831,
834 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (ruling that a court must find personal jurisdiction before
modifying or enforcing a registered order (citing Pinner v. Pinner, 234 S.E.2d 633, 636
(N.C. Ct. App. 1977))).
425. MINN. STAT. § 518C.602 (1994).
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This section outlines the mechanics of registering another
state's support order that is to be enforced by a Minnesota
tribunal.426 These procedures differ little from those required
under prior law.
4 27
3. Section 51 8C. 603: Effect of Registration for Enforce-
ment
(a) A support order or income-withholding order issued in
another state is registered when the order is filed in the
registering tribunal of this state.
(b) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable
in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as
an order issued by a tribunal of this state.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in sections 518C.601 to
518C.612, a tribunal of this state shall recognize and enforce,
but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing tribunal
had jurisdiction.428
Although registration under UIFSA is almost identical to
that required under prior Minnesota law, the intent of registra-
tion is "radically different."4 29  Under Subsection (a), once an
out-of-state order is registered in Minnesota, the order remains
an order of the out-of-state tribunal that is to be enforced by
Minnesota.4"' The registered order remains subject to the
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the other state if the
requirements for that jurisdiction remain intact.4 3'
Subsection (b) changes prior Minnesota law, which
specifically permitted an order to be reopened, stayed, or
vacated.432 These procedures are not available with UIFSA.433
Under UIFSA, Minnesota is enforcing an order of another state,
426. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 602 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1994).
427. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.24 (1992)
(RURESA registration procedure)).
428. MINN. STAT. § 518C.603 (1994).
429. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1994).
430. Id.
431. Id. See alSo MINN. STAT. § 518C.205 (1994) (requirements of continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction).
432. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.25, subd.
1 (1992)).
433. UNIV. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 603 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 157 (Supp. 1994).
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not one that has been issued by a Minnesota tribunal.
Subsection (c) mandates that a Minnesota tribunal enforce
the out-of-state support order. This changes prior law, which
stated that a "registered order shall be treated in the same
manner as a support order issued by a court of this state."434
Minnesota cannot modify a properly registered out-of-state order
except under the limited conditions set forth in Sections
518C.601 to 518C.612.
4. Section 518C.604: Choice of Law
(a) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent,
amount, and duration of current payments and other
obligations of support and the payment of arrearages under
the order.
(b) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation
under the laws of this state or of the issuing state, whichever
is longer, applies.435
The purpose of Subsection (a) is to identify certain
situations where Minnesota law does not apply to an interstate
enforcement proceeding.436  For example, Minnesota must
enforce a child support order of a state that requires support to
age twenty-one, even though under Minnesota law support
usually ends at age eighteen.437
Subsection (b) declares that in the interstate support
context, Minnesota must apply the longer of any two state
statutes of limitations. The purpose of the provision is to
prevent obligors from selecting a state that has a shorter statute
of limitations than the state that initially issued the order.4"
434. RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.25, subd. 1
(1992)).
435. MINN. STAT. § 518C.604 (1994).
436. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 604 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 158 (Supp. 1994).
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that in a URESA proceeding, the Minnesota
trial court was not bound by an earlier New York order and was required to apply
Minnesota law. State ex rel. McDonnell v. McCutcheon, 337 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn.
1983). UIFSA is intended to preclude such rulings. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT
AcT § 604 cmt., 9 U.LA. 158 (Supp. 1994).
437. A child is defined by Minnesota law "as an individual under 18 years of age, an
individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary school, or an individual who,
by reason of physical or mental condition, is incapable of self-support." MINN. STAT.
§ 518.54, subd. 2 (1994).
438. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 604 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 158 (Supp. 1994).
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For example, if an obligor accumulated a large arrearage over a
long period of time, it was felt that the obligor should not gain
an undue benefit, which might reduce the amount of the
arrearage, from a choice of residence.439
5. Section 518C. 605: Notice of Registration of Order
(a) When a support order or income-withholding order
issued in another state is registered, the registering tribunal
shall notify the nonregistering party. Notice must be given by
certified or registered mail or by any means of personal
service authorized by the law of this state. The notice must
be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and the
documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
(b) The notice must inform the nonregistering party:
(1) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date
of registration in the same manner as an order issued by
a tribunal of this state;
(2) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement
of the registered order must be requested within 20 days
after the date of mailing or personal service of the
notice;
(3) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of
the registered order in a timely manner will result in
confirmation of the order and enforcement of the order
and the alleged arrearages and precludes further contest
of that order with respect to any matter that could have
been asserted; and
(4) of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
(c) Upon registration of an income-withholding order for
enforcement, the registering tribunal shall notify the obligor's
employer pursuant to section 518.611 or 518.613."40
Subsection (a) mandates that the nonregistering party be
notified when an out-of-state support order or income-withhold-
ing order is registered in Minnesota."' Subsection (b) pro-
vides that the nonregistering party be informed of the effect of
registration." 2  As noted earlier, for a properly registered
order to be enforceable, Minnesota must possess personal
439. Id.
440. MINN. STAT. § 518C.605 (1994).
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jurisdiction over the obligor.44
6. Section 518C.606: Procedure to Contest Validity or
Enforcement of Registered Order
(a) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or
enforcement of a registered order in this state shall request
a hearing within 20 days after the date of mailing or personal
service of notice of the registration. The nonregistering party
may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an
allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to
contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any
alleged arrearages pursuant to section 518C.607.
(b) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or
enforcement of the registered order in a timely manner, the
order is confirmed by operation of law.
(c) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the
validity or enforcement of the registered order, the register-
ing tribunal shall schedule the matter for hearing and give
notice to the parties by first class mail of the date, time, and
place of the hearing."'
Subsection (a) substantially alters prior law. 5  First, it
allows either an obligor or an obligee to seek registration of a
support order in Minnesota.' 4 Second, it does not allow a
challenger to attack the fundamental provisions of the registered
order in Minnesota.4 7 To do that, the challenger must return
to the state that originally issued the order."8  Furthermore,
challengers are limited by the laws of the issuing state.449
Defenses that may be heard by a Minnesota tribunal include lack
of personal jurisdiction, payment of support, or termination of
support obligation.45 °
443. See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
444. MINN. STAT. § 518C.606 (1994).
445. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 606 cmt., 9 U.LA 160 (Supp. 1994)
(stating that this subsection is "philosophically very different" from previous law).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 518C.606 (1994) with RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified
at MINN. STAT. § 518C.25 (1992)).




450. See MINN. STAT. § 518C.607 (1994); UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT
§ 606 cmt., 9 U.LA 160 (Supp. 1994). Custody or visitation concerns cannot be raised
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Subsection (b) precludes an untimely contest.4 5' Subsec-
tion (c) mandates that a Minnesota tribunal conduct a hearing
if the nonregistering party contests the registration.
7. Section 518C.607: Contest of Registration or En-
forcement
(a) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a
registered order or seeking to vacate the registration has the
burden of proving one or more of the following defenses:
(1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over
the contesting party;
(2) the order was obtained by fraud;
(3) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified
by a later order;
(4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending
appeal;
(5) there is a defense under the law of this state to the
remedy sought;
(6) full or partial payment has been made; or
(7) the statute of limitation under section 518C.604
precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages.
(b) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial
defense under paragraph (a), a tribunal may stay enforce-
ment of the registered order, continue the proceeding to
permit production of additional relevant evidence, and issue
other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the
registered order may be enforced by all remedies available
under the law of this state.
(c) If the contesting party does not establish a defense under
paragraph (a) to the validity or enforcement of the order, the
registering tribunal shall issue an order confirming the
order.453
Subsection (a) places the burden on the nonregistering
party to assert any of the listed defenses that exist to the
registration of a support order.454 Subsection (c) mandates
as a defense or counterclaim in proceedings under RURESA. England v. England, 337
N.W.2d 681, 684 (Minn. 1983).
451. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 606 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 160 (Supp. 1994).
452. Id. Federal regulations govern the allowable time in which a Title IV-D case
can be attacked. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1988)).
453. MINN. STAT. § 518C.607 (1994).
454. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 607 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 161 (Supp. 1994).
[Vol. 21
74
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss4/1
MINNESOTA ADOPTS ULFSA
that an order be enforced where no defense is established.
8. Section 518C.608: Confirmed Order
If a contesting party has received notice of registration under
section 518C.605, confirmation of a registered order, whether
by operation of law or after notice and hearing, precludes
further contest of the order based upon facts that were
known by the contesting party at the time of registration with
respect to any matter that could have been asserted at the
time of registration.455
Under this section, confirmation of a support order may
result from a failure to contest the order or an unsuccessful
contest.4 56  Once the order is properly registered, a party
cannot later raise an issue that could have been raised at the
hearing.
4 57
9. Section 518C.609: Procedure to Register Child Support
Order of Another State for Modification
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or
to modify and enforce, a child support order issued in
another state shall register that order in this state in the same
manner provided in sections 518C.601 to 518C.604 if the
order has not been registered. A petition for modification
may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for modifica-
tion.
458
Sections 518C.609 through 518C.612 deal with the limited
conditions under which Minnesota may modify a support order
issued in another state. It should be noted that as long as the
issuing state maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over its
455. MINN. STAT. § 518C.608 (1994).
456. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 608 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 161, 162 (Supp.
1994).
457. Id. The registration process, however, does not waive a challenge to the
personal jurisdiction of the court. Scott v. Scott, 492 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992). See also Chapman v. Chapman, 252 Cal. Rptr. 359, 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(holding registration of order does not preclude obligor from later contesting amount
of unpaid support).
458. MINN. STAT. § 518C.609 (1994).
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order, Minnesota is precluded from modifying it. 9 It is only
when the issuing state no longer has a "sufficient interest" in the
action that Minnesota may modify the existing order."6 A
"sufficient interest" is lost when neither the minor child nor any
of the parties live in the issuing state. 61 This is a substantial




A party wishing to register another state's support order in
Minnesota so that the order can be modified must both comply
with the pleading requirements found in Section 518C.311 and
follow the registration procedures set forth in Section
518C.602.4 3  Minnesota must, of course, have personal
jurisdiction over the parties to the action if a modification action
is to go forward. '
10. Section 518C. 610: Effect of Registration for Modifi-
cation
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of
another state registered for purposes of modification, in the
same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal of
this state, but the registered order may be modified only if
the requirements of section 518C.611 have been met4
The power to modify a child support order of another
jurisdiction is sharply curtailed by Section 518C.611. However,
if an order is modified, it may be enforced in the same manner
as a support order registered for the purposes of enforce-
ment.
46 6
11. Section 518C.611: Modification of Child Support
Order of Another State
(a) After a child support order issued in another state has
been registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this
459. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 609 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 162 (Supp. 1994).
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Under prior law, the court held that the full faith and credit clause did not
preclude Minnesota from modifying future child support installments required by a
Wisconsin divorce decree. Arora v. Arora, 351 N.W.2d 668, 671 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
463. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 609 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 162 (Supp. 1994).
464. Arora, 351 N.W.2d at 670.
465. MINN. STAT. § 518C.610 (1994).
466. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AT § 610 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 163 (Supp. 1994).
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state may modify that order only if, after notice and hearing,
it finds that:
(1) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor
do not reside in the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state
seeks modification; and
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state; or
(2) an individual party or the child is subject to the
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal and all of the
individual parties have filed a written consent in the
issuing tribunal providing that a tribunal of this state may
modify the support order and assume continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the order.
(b) Modification of a registered child support order is subject
to the same requirements, procedures, and defenses that
apply to the modification of an order issued by a tribunal of
this state and the order may be enforced and satisfied in the
same manner.
(c) A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a
child support order that may not be modified under the law
of the issuing state.
(d) On issuance of an order modifying a child support order
issued in another state, a tribunal of this state becomes the
tribunal of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
(e) Within 30 days after issuance of a modified child support
order, the party obtaining the modification shall file a
certified copy of the order with the issuing tribunal which
had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier order,
and in each tribunal in which the party knows that earlier
order has been registered.467
This section sets forth more restrictive requirements for
modifying child support orders than found in prior law.
4 8
Minnesota may modify an out-of-state court order only if certain
conditions are met. 9 As noted earlier, the continuing, exclu-
467. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611 (1994).
468. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.LA 163, 163-64 (Supp.
1994). Compare MINN. STAT. § 518C.611 (1994) with RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly
codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.25 (1992) (effect of registration)).
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sive jurisdiction of the out-of-state tribunal remains intact as long
as one party or the child continues to reside there.4 70  If
neither a party nor a child live in the issuing state, the original
order remains in effect until it is modified.471
Subsection (a) (1) requires that the petitioner be a nonresi-
dent of Minnesota if modification is sought here. The respon-
dent must also be subject to the personal jurisdiction of Minne-
sota. This prevents a litigant from choosing to seek modification
in a local court to the disadvantage of the other party.472
Subsection (a) alters the traditional view of a state's power
over nonresidents. Traditionally, anyone properly served with
process within the boundaries of a state is subject to the
47jurisdiction of the state's courts.   Under Subsection (a),
however, an obligor who is in Minnesota to visit his or her
children cannot be served with a modification motion, if a valid,
out-of-state order has been registered in this state.474
Similarly, an obligee who seeks to modify or enforce an
order involving a Minnesota obligor cannot be made subject to
a cross-motion to modify custody or visitation because the issuing
state lost its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support
order.475 The obligor is required to bring the motion in a
state other than Minnesota, if the obligor lives in Minnesota.476
If both parties have left the issuing state and now reside in
Minnesota, this section is not applicable.477
The parties are allowed by Subsection (a) (2) to terminate
the continuing jurisdiction of the issuing state by agreement,
which must be filed with the issuing tribunal.478
Subsection (b) allows Minnesota to modify a support order
470. Id. This is the standard used by the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)).
471. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 163, 164 (Supp.
1994).
472. Id.
473. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990).
474. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 611 cmt., 9 U.LA. 163, 164 (Supp.
1994). The obligee can only bring the motion to modify in a state (1) in which the
obligee is not a resident and (2) that has personal jurisdiction over the obligor. Id.
475. Id.
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if the issuing state has lost continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.47 9
Subsection (c), however, preventsMinnesota from modifying any
aspect of the out-of-state order that is in itself
nonmodifiable."
Once an order is modified by Minnesota, this state becomes
the one-order state to be recognized by all UIFSA states. 1
Subsection (e) provides for notice to the original issuing state,
once Minnesota has modified a support order.
An analysis of Scott v. Scott 2 illustrates the importance of
this section. In Scott, the obligee had relocated to Minnesota
after the couple's marriage was dissolved in Arizona." Follow-
ing the dissolution, the obligor was in Minnesota on five occa-
sions.
48 4
The ex-wife registered the Arizona decree in Washington
County, Minnesota, and simultaneously filed a motion for
support modification." 5 Notice of the filing and the modifica-
tion action were given to the obligor by the Washington County
Court Administrator. 6 When the obligor failed to vacate the
registration within the statutorily prescribed twenty-day period,
the trial court concluded he had waived any challenge to the
order, including the modification action, and went ahead and
modified the child support order. 7 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed the modification decision, finding that the
obligor did not waive the requirement of personal jurisdiction
when he failed to challenge the filing. 8 The court ruled that
there was no waiver." 9
479. Id. at 165.
480. Id. For example, an out-of-state order may require support until the child
reaches adulthood, defined as age 21 in the issuing state, while adulthood in Minnesota,
the modifying state, is 18. The age of support established by the issuing state is
controlling. See id.
481. Id.
482. 492 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
483. Scott v. Scott, 492 N.W.2d at 832.
484. Id. at 833. The obligor was in Minnesota briefly in 1986, 1987, and 1988 to
pick up his daughter for visitation. Id. In 1990 he had a six-hour layover at the
Minneapolis/St. Paul airport. Id. The obligor's last contacts, in June 1991, were to
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In its opinion, the court applied the reasoning of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, which had distinguished between
registration and enforcement of a foreign support order in
construing identical RURESA provisions.49 ° In Pinner v. Pin-
ner,4 91 the North Carolina court held that personal jurisdiction
is not necessary for registration of the foreign support order
under RURESA.492 The Pinner court reasoned that the act of
registration "does not prejudice any rights of the obligor; it
merely changes the status of the foreign support order by
allowing it to be treated the same as a support order issued by
a court [of the registering state] ."' However, the Pinner court
said that when the obligee requests modification or enforcement
of the registered order, a court must. then determine whether
jurisdiction exists over the person or property of the obligor."4
The Scott court held that an obligor is not required to object
to the court's jurisdiction to modify a foreign support order in
a proceeding to register the order under Minnesota Statute
Sections 518C.22 to 518C.25 (RURESA) and concluded that the
obligor had properly raised the jurisdictional challenge in his
motion to dismiss the support modification proceeding.495 The
court said that "[t]he purpose of the proceeding to vacate
registration of the foreign support order is to contest the
original or continuing validity of the foreign support order
itself."4 96 The court noted that the decision did not deprive
the ex-wife of a remedy.497 Under RURESA, she could bring
the action in a state with personal jurisdiction over the obli-
gor.
498
The impact of Section 611 on the traditional bases of
jurisdiction is startling. For example, assume a situation where
a couple is divorced in Arizona and that state establishes child
490. Id. (citing Pinner v. Pinner, 234 S.E.2d 633, 636 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977)). The
Pinner view has been adopted by several other jurisdictions. Id. (citing Lagerwey v.
Lagerwey, 681 P.2d 309,311 (Alaska 1984); Wilson v. Ransom, 446 N.W.2d 6,9-10 (Neb.
1989); Stephens v. Stephens, 331 S.E.2d 484, 489 (Va. 1985); Davanis v. Davanis, 392
N.W.2d 108, 112 (Wis. CL App. 1986)).
491. 234 S.E.2d 633 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
492. Pinner v. Pinner, 234 S.E.2d at 636 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Scott v. Scott, 492 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Minn. CL App. 1992).
496. Id. (citing Aron v. Aron, 274 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)).
497. Id. at 831 n.1.
498. Id. (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 411 N.W.2d 238, 240 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
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support. Assume the obligor moves to Minnesota where the
Arizonajudgment is properly registered, and assume the obligee
visits Minnesota and is personally served with a motion to modify
child support. Although such service is consistent with the
jurisdictional requisites of Burnham v. Superior Court,499 the
modification motion cannot be heard in Minnesota. The reason
is that the motion to modify fails to fulfill the requirement of
being brought by "a petitioner who is a nonresident of the
state."5" The obligor is required to bring the modification
motion in Arizona. The provision is not applicable, of course,
if both parties are living in the forum state.
There are significant jurisdictional differences in a child
support modification matter brought under UIFSA and one in
which the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act is
invoked. The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
provides that the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction may
"decline" jurisdiction." 1 The privilege of declining jurisdiction
is not permitted under UIFSA.
5°2
12. Section 518C.612: Recognition of Order Modified in
Another State
A tribunal of this state shall recognize a modification of its
earlier child support order by a tribunal of another state
which assumed jurisdiction pursuant to a law substantially
similar to this chapter and, upon request, except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, shall:
(1) enforce the order that was modified only as to
amounts accruing before the modification;
(2) enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order;
(3) provide other appropriate relief only for violations of
that order which occurred before the effective date of
the modification; and
(4) recognize the modifying order of the other state,
upon registration, for the purpose of enforcement.
503
499. 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
500. MINN. STAT. § 518C.611(a)(1)(ii) (1994).
501. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT Acr § 611 cmt., 9 U.LA. 163, 165 (Supp.
1994) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1988)). Similar provisions can be found in Section
14 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Id.
502. Id.
503. MINN. STAT. § 518C.612 (1994).
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This section provides that Minnesota give deference to a
support order of another state if a Minnesota order was modified
there. Minnesota retains power to deal with violations of an
order that occurred before the order was modified.
G. Section 518C. 701: Proceeding to Determine Parentage
(a) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating or
responding tribunal in a proceeding brought under this
chapter or a law substantially similar to this chapter, the
uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act, or the revised
uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act to determine
that the petitioner is a parent of a particular child or to
determine that a respondent is a parent of that child.
(b) In a proceeding to determine parentage, a responding
tribunal of this state shall apply the parentage act, sections
257.51 to 257.74, and the rules of this state on choice of
law.
504
This section permits a parentage action in the interstate
context.5° 5 The parentage action does not need to be joined
with a support claim, and either the mother or the alleged
biological father may bring the action."6 The use of the word
"petitioner" was intentional and conveys the gender-neutral
position of this section.0 7 It is intended to encourage fathers
to seek establishment of their parentage with their offspring.
5 8
Subsection (b) requires that parentage "shall" be deter-
mined, which is a change from previous law. RURESA autho-
rized a responding court to take such action but did not require
504. Id. § 518C.701.
505. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT AcT § 701 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 166 (Supp. 1994).
506. Id. The party bringing the action must, of course, meet the criteria established
in MINN. STAT. § 257.57 (1994) (determining the father and child relationship, who
may bring an action, and when an action may be brought).
507. Sampson, supra note 239, at 166 n.163.
508. Id. This provision does not necessarily eliminate the kind of difficulties
discussed in Markert v. Behm, where a statute barred the putative father from bringing
a paternity action unless he first married the mother, acknowledged paternity, or
voluntarily promised in writing to support the child. Markert v. Behm, 394 N.W.2d 239,
242-43 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The court justified this statutory provision on the
ground it was needed to protect minor children from the stigma and distress that could
result if an alleged putative father-were granted standing. Id. at 244. The provision was
held not to violate the equal protection clause because the putative father's interest in
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it to do so. 509
The question of whether the minor child and all counties
that might be involved in the dispute should be joined in a
single action is left to the interpretation of Minnesota Statutes
Sections 257.59 and 257.60.51' However, efficiency and basic
fairness dictate that they should. For example, in County of
Dakota v. Hendrickson,5  the court held that dismissal of a
parentage action brought by the minor child's mother and the
county was not res judicata as to the minor child's independent
parentage action or as to interests of another county seeking
reimbursement for support spent on the child's behalf following
dismissal of the mother's suit.51 2  In Johnson v. Hunter,513 the
court held that an unrepresented minor child is not in privity
with its mother for resjudicata purposes when a paternity action
is brought to determine the child's father. 14 In another
509. The RURESA section read:
If an obligor asserts as a defense that he is not the father of the child for
whom support is sought and it appears to the court that the defense is not
frivolous, and if both the parties are present at the hearing or the proof
required in the case indicates that the presence of either or both of the parties
is not necessary, the court may adjudicate the paternity issue. Otherwise the
court may adjourn the hearing until the paternity issue has been adjudicated.
RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.18 (1992)).
510. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.59-.60 (1994).
511. 482 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 482 N.W.2d 516 (Minn. 1992).
512. County of Dakota v. Hendrickson, 482 N.W.2d at 518.
513. 447 N.W.2d 871 (Minn. 1989).
514. Johnson v. Hunter, 447 N.W.2d at 876-77. See also McMenomy v. Ryden, 276
Minn. 55, 59, 148 N.W.2d 804, 807 (1967) (asserting that privity must be determined
by the facts of each case); State v. EA.H., 246 Minn. 299, 304-05, 75 N.W.2d 195,
199-200 (1956) (contending that mother has standing to appeal judgment of
nonpaternity in action brought by state); State v. Sax, 231 Minn. 1, 8, 42 N.W.2d 680,
684-85 (1950) (distinguishing that mother is party to illegitimacy proceedings even if
action is brought by state); Ex parte Snow, 508 So.2d 266, 267-68 (Ala. 1987) (finding
that mother and child are not "substantially identical parties"; therefore all elements
required for res judicata are not met); Maller v. Cohen, 531 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988), cert. denied, 537 N.E.2d 811 (111. 1989) (finding that unwed mother and
her child have "difference of interests" in filing independent paternity actions); Spada
v. Pauley, 385 N.W.2d 746, 750 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 389 N.W.2d 85 (Mich.
1986) (finding that child's interests are broader than just securing support); Seattle ex
rel. Sullivan v. Beasley, 308 S.E.2d 288, 290-91 (N.C. 1983) (asserting that privity denotes
a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property and does not
ordinarily arise from the relationship between parent and child; this privity does not
exist to bar a child's subsequent suit where no such concurrent relationship to the same
right exists); Commonwealth ex rel. Gray v.Johnson, 376 S.E.2d 787, 790 (Va. Ct. App.
1989) (holding that child is not bound by paternity determination in action brought
by mother unless child is named a party, represented by a guardian ad litem, or given
adequate opportunity to litigate issue).
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decision, Nicholson v. Maack,5 the court held that the fact that
the putative father's action to establish paternity is time barred
is not a reason to prevent appointment of a guardian ad litem
for the minor child if the paternity action is deemed in the
child's best interests.1 6
H. Interstate Rendition
1. Section 518C.801: Grounds for Rendition
(a) For purposes of this article, "governor" includes an
individual performing the functions of governor or the
executive authority of a state covered by this chapter.
(b) The governor of this state may:
(1) demand that the governor of another state surrender
an individual found in the other state who is charged
criminally in this state with having failed to provide for
the support of an obligee; or
(2) on the demand by the governor of another state,
surrender an individual found in this state who is
charged criminally in the other state with having failed
to provide for the support of an obligee.
(c) A provision for extradition of individuals not inconsistent
with this chapter applies to the demand even if the individual
whose surrender is demanded was not in the demanding state
when the crime was allegedly committed and has not fled
therefrom. 57
This section is virtually identical to prior law.518  Subsec-
tion (3) of the former Act created some theoretical discussion
but few decisions.51 9
515. 400 N.W.2d 160 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
516. Nicholson v. Maack, 400 N.W.2d at 165.
517. MINN. STAT. § 518C.801 (1994).
518. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.31
(1992)).
519. See In re King, 474 P.2d 983, 991 (Cal. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931 (1971)
(holding a provision of the welfare statute that punished nonsupporting out-of-state
fathers as felons as unconstitutional because it violated equal protection); see also Daniel
L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State Criminal Law, 38 TEX. L.
REv. 763, 784-87 (1960) (discussing the permissible extent to which the state may
recognize matters taking place beyond its territorial boundaries).
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2. Section 518C.802: Conditions of Rendition
(a) Before making demand that the governor of another state
surrender an individual charged criminally in this state with
having failed to provide for the support of an obligee, the
governor of this state may require a prosecutor of this state to
demonstrate that at least 60 days previously the obligee had
initiated proceedings for support pursuant to this chapter or
that the proceeding would be of no avail.
(b) If, under this chapter or a law substantially similar to this
chapter, the uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act,
or the revised uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act,
the governor of another state makes a demand that the
governor of this state surrender an individual charged
criminally in that state with having failed to provide for the
support of a child or other individual to whom a duty of
support is owed, the governor may require a prosecutor to
investigate the demand and report whether a proceeding for
support has been initiated or would be effective. If it appears
that a proceeding would be effective but has not been
initiated, the governor may delay honoring the demand for
a reasonable time to permit the initiation of a proceeding.
(c) If a proceeding for support has been initiated and the
individual whose rendition is demanded prevails, the gover-
nor may decline to honor the demand. If the petitioner
prevails and the individual whose rendition is demanded is
subject to a support order, the governor may decline to
honor the demand if the individual is complying with the
support order.52°
This section is virtually identical to previous law.
521
L Section 518C. 901: Uniformity of Application and Construction
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its
general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the
subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
5 22
This provision makes no significant substantive changes
520. MINN. STAT. § 518C.802 (1994).
521. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.32 (1992)
(conditions of interstate rendition)).
522. MINN. STAT. § 518C.901 (1994).
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from prior law.52
V. FEDERAL INTERVENTION
Now that Minnesota has passed its version of UIFSA and
surrounded it with a cadre of administrative and enforcement
statutes, the question remains whether Minnesota's effort will
stem the federal legislative tide that has been gaining such
strong momentum since the late 1980s.
The impetus for federal intervention began twenty years ago
when Congress began to move aggressively into the child support
arena. The child support system moved from a solely state-law-
based system to one that was a federally imposed system of state
laws, complemented by federal law, and enforced by both state
and federal governments.2 4
One can point to the passage of Tide IV-D, added to the
Social Security Act in 1975,25 as the real beginning of serious
federalism in the child support area. In Title IV-D, Congress
mandated that every state child support system provide enforce-
ment services to custodial parents and their children.126 Tide
IV-D also mandated free assistance to AFDC recipients.5 27 Any
other parent was eligible for IV-D services, regardless of income,
upon completion of a written application and payment of a fee
not exceeding twenty-five dollars.2 8  As an incentive, the
federal government, through its reimbursement plan under Tide
IV-D, agreed to pay the states for most of the costs associated
with these systems. 29
By the late 1970s, the impact of Title IV-D was apparent as
virtually all states had some form of a statewide child support
enforcement agency.5 30  State performance, however, was
523. See RURESA, supra note 15 (formerly codified at MINN. STAT. § 518C.35
(1992)).
524. Allen, supra note 52, at 661.
525. See Social Services Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337, 2351
(1975) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-655 (1988)).
526. Allen, supra note 52, at 660. See 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1988).
527. Allen, supra note 52, at 660. See 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1988).
528. Haynes, supra note 50, at 693. See 42 U.S.C. § 654 (1988).
529. Allen, supra note 52, at 660. See 42 U.S.C. § 655 (1988). Title IV-D also created
the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement and mandated that states establish
state child support offices. Haynes, supra note 50, at 693. The program provided
various child support services: location of absent parents, parentage establishment,
establishment and enforcement of support, and modification of support. Id.
530. Allen, supra note 52, at 660.
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judged to be poor.53' The state systems were dissimilar and
lack of uniformity made enforcement of support orders, or their
establishment, unwieldy.5"2 Congress, in an effort to bring
greater uniformity to the process and more effective collection
of support, passed child support enforcement legislation in 1984,
1986, and 1988.53' The federal government required that
states establish income withholding of child support payments,
create child support guidelines, allow administrative or quasi-jud-
icial agencies to litigate support cases, extend the period of time
in which paternity could be established, permit liens and
garnishments of obligors' income, and allow states to capture
state tax refunds for arrears.534 Congress also authorized the
interception of federal income tax refunds for recovery of
arrears, established the federal Parent Locator System, and
authorized IRS full-service collection of particularly difficult
cases.
535
As the problem continued to escalate, Congress responded
with additional legislation. Major support efforts, such as those
found in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993536
(OBRA 93), attempted to create effective mechanisms for
obtaining support. Under OBRA 93, the states were required to
provide a simplified civil process for the voluntary establishment
of paternity that was available both in and out of the hospi-
tal,53 7 the most likely time when many fathers of a child born
out-of-wedlock could be identified. These procedures were in
place by January 1, 1995.53
Congress also established the Qualified Medical Child
Support Order (QMCSO), a mechanism for improving health




533. See supra text accompanying notes 56-63.
534. Allen, supra note 52, at 660. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)-(10) (1988).
535. Allen, supra note 52, at 660. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 664, 653, 652(b) (1988).
536. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 666-1396 (West
Supp. 1995)).
537. Allen, supra note 52, at 661.
538. Id.
539. A QMCSO is similar to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) and
must contain the information required by federal law and be approved by the plan
administrator. Id. at 662.
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Altogether, fifty-four separate jurisdictions continue to have
primary responsibility for child support, including the fifty states,
the territories, and the District of Columbia."4  Criticism
remains, however, that there exists a patchwork of varying
methods, procedures, and uneven results.54" ' In Michigan, the
governor seems to have thrown up his hands at the support
problem, asking that it be completely turned over to the federal
government 42 Michigan remains alone in this view of federal
rule in the support area.
One effort aimed at federalization of support was made by
Congressmen Downey and Hyde.543 They proposed that state
trial courts and agencies retain paternity jurisdiction with an
emphasis on establishing paternity through nonadversarial
means.5" State courts and agencies would also continue to
establish initial child support orders; however, all support orders
would be created by application of national child support
guidelines."4 An obligor aggrieved by a support order could
appeal to a federal administrative agency such as the Social
Security Administration." The same federal agency would
handle modification requests but would determine whether a
change should be made by primarily relying on an individual's
income tax returns. 547 Support enforcement and collection
would be handled by the IRS. s"
Although federalizing aspects of child support may have
some advantages, there are serious concerns that weigh heavily
540. Id. at 660.
541. See id.
542. Id. According to Michigan's Governor Engler,
Interstate Child Support is operated by each state. It is the most difficult part
of the Child Support Program to operate. Because the program deals with
other states' laws and enforcement staff, performance varies dramatically from
state to state. We propose that the federal government take over Michigan's
Interstate Support obligation. No other state in the nation has proposed such
a radical change in operations. Under this proposal DSS and the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) would enter into a pilot project agreement to allow the
testing of a federal takeover of this portion of the program.
Id. at 663 n.22 (quoting a report by Governor Engler entitled To Strengthen Michigan
Families--1994).
543. Haynes, supra note 50, at 695. See H.R. 773, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S.
967, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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against such an overhaul. 49 Federalization may result in an
unnecessary fragmentation of domestic cases between state and
federal judicial systems. 5° With one system handling a divorce
or parentage and another system handling support issues that
are intimately related to the latter, confusion, overlap, and
sweeping inefficiency might well result.
Problems in locating an obligor can in many cases be better
handled at the state level. The federal Office of Child Support
Enforcement operates a Parent Locator Service that for child
support purposes has access to records of six federal agen-
cies.5"' However, much of the agency information is dated
because it requires only quarterly or annual reporting.5 52 State
sources of information, such as the Department of Revenue,
Department of Motor Vehicles, credit bureau reports, property
listings, and quarterly wage statement, are probably much more
up to date.53
Another concern, especially if the Internal Revenue Service
becomes the primary enforcement agency, is whether IRS agents,
who view tax enforcement as their main priority, would be any
more responsive to the support problem than are present state
workers.5 54 An additional concern is whether a federal agency
would distribute collected support any faster than one that is
state-based.55
Given the efforts of states like Minnesota to adopt a uniform
act, despite some of its questionable sections, it would be
surprising to find the federal government going much further in
the immediate future. The federal government, along with the
states, will need another decade of experience with UIFSA
before a reasoned judgment regarding its efficacy can be made.
However, if after this final testing period, the states have failed
to show substantial progress in child support collections, it is a
good bet that Congress will federalize the entire support effort.
549. Id. at 695-96.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) is
Minnesota's latest attempt to deal with the child support
collection problem. Based upon the model act promulgated in
1992 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UIFSA replaces and expands RURESA, its predeces-
sor child support collection statute. The Act contains many new
and innovative features intended to make interstate collection of
child support faster and more efficient.
Passage of UIFSA, however, has raised questions about the
viability of a few of its provisions. Specifically, constitutional
issues relating to jurisdiction and due process, not discussed by
the Minnesota Legislature prior to enactment, will need to be
resolved at some future date by the courts.
Finally, UIFSA is the states' last chance to oversee collection
of child support. The federal government is waiting to see if,
under UIFSA, substantial progress is made in dealing with the
child support problem. If not, Congress will most likely step in
and federalize the entire support effort.
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